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This dissertation investigates the impact of Social Security on the retirement 
decision.  In the first half of the dissertation, I investigate the impact of the repeal of the 
Retirement Earnings Test (RET) for 65-to-69-year olds on the labor supply of older men.  
Under the RET, Social Security benefits are taxed if earnings exceed a stipulated amount.  
Using life tables from the National Vital Statistics Report, I first demonstrate that for 
white males, in expected value, the RET acts as a tax on beneficiary earnings.  Thus, the 
repeal of the RET is effectively a tax cut for 65-to-69-year-old men. 
 Using data from the Outgoing Rotation Groups of the CPS, I estimate the effect of 
the repeal of the RET on the labor supply of older workers aged 55-75 years.  In a life-
cycle context, younger workers (55-to-64-year-olds) are expected to reduce labor supply, 
while workers in the age group targeted by the repeal (65-to-69-year-olds) should choose 
to increase labor supply. 
The empirical results suggest that older workers work more because of an 
effective income tax cut, while younger workers reduce their labor supply.  Further, the 
 
increased labor supply among older workers stems primarily from older workers staying 
in the labor force longer rather than from older workers re-entering the labor force. 
In the second half of the dissertation, I use data from the 1970 and 1980 Censuses 
and a reduced form model to examine joint retirement decisions in a household.  The 
eligibility criteria for Social Security produce peaks in retirement at ages 62 and 65.  
Moreover, the retirement of one’s spouse can also affect one’s labor supply because of 
income pooling within the family or complementarities in leisure.   
I find that the spouse’s turning 62 and 65 affect one’s own exit from the labor 
force.  To test whether leisure complementarities are the reason for those cross effects, I 
use protection from age discrimination as an instrument for wages and find that, while 
own coverage by age discrimination laws sometimes increases own labor supply, spousal 
coverage has no effect.  This finding suggests that the linkages in labor supply among 
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 The link between Social Security incentives and labor supply behavior has long 
been of interest to economists.  The broader question of the impact of wages on labor 
supply is one of the oldest known questions in the field of economics.  Indeed, as 
Pencavel (1986) notes, “conjectures about whether an increase in remuneration brought 
forth more work effort can be traced back at least to the mercantile economists.”  Given 
the current Social Security debate, the link between Social Security incentives and labor 
supply is particularly worthy of investigation.  With the solvency of the Social Security 
System in doubt and politicians clamoring for reform, it is important to determine how 
changing rules within Social Security affects the retirement decisions made by workers. 
 Over the past half-century, labor force participation among older men has 
declined dramatically.  While in 1950 nearly 60% of men between the ages of 65 and 69 
were in the labor force, by 1990, the number stood at only 26%.  This large decrease has 
often been attributed to the growth of jobs covered by Social Security as well as the 
increasing share of household income Social Security benefits constitute among 
households with heads age 65 or older (Diamond and Gruber (2000)). 
 Another piece of evidence that suggests that Social Security has a significant 
effect on the labor supply decisions of older workers is the peak in the hazard rate of 
retirement at age 62, the earliest age at which one becomes eligible for Social Security 
retirement benefits.  There is also a peak in retirement at age 65, but this finding is not as 
easily attributable to Social Security.  Medicare eligibility, pension eligibility, and 
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mandatory retirement also become important at age 65 and are other feasible 
explanations.  The peak in retirement at age 62, on the other hand, seems to have no other 
good explanation than Social Security eligibility (Hurd (1990)).  Furthermore, as Burtless 
and Moffitt (1986) point out, there was no peak in retirement at age 62 in 1960, when 
men were not allowed to draw Social Security Retirement Benefits before age 65. 
 Despite this evidence, there is still no consensus that Social Security was the 
driving force behind the reduction in the labor supply of the elderly.  For instance, Aaron 
(1982) offers a number of explanations for early retirement other than Social Security 
eligibility.  As real income has risen over time, individuals may have simply chosen to 
consume more goods, including retirement.  In addition, early retirement could be chosen 
because it might increase the present value of Social Security benefit streams, especially 
among workers who had an older spouse, a short life expectancy, or both.  Finally, the 
author suggests the possibility that workers misperceive Social Security benefits because 
of a high discount rate. 
In his survey, Hurd (1990) notes that other studies also find no impact of Social 
Security on retirement.  Some papers attribute this result to the growth in company 
pension plans, which often have incentives built in to encourage workers to retire as early 
as age 55, thereby decreasing the importance of Social Security retirement benefits which 
cannot be claimed before age 62.  Hurd also suggests that other papers possibly find no 
effect of Social Security on retirement because of the particular definition of retirement 
they use.  He remarks that because retirement can be defined as either a permanent 
departure from the labor force, a self-assessed retirement, “a sudden and discontinuous 
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drop in the hours of work,” or merely the departure from a firm, the finding that results 
are contingent on the definition of retirement chosen is not surprising. 
 
I. How Social Security Affects Labor Supply 
The Social Security system was established as a social insurance program to 
insure workers against loss of income due to old age, among other things.  However, over 
the lifecycle, the first several cohorts of Social Security beneficiaries received more in 
benefits than they paid into the system.  Because those cohorts were not expecting Social 
Security benefits, this essentially amounts to a wealth shock, as lifetime wealth has 
increased, possibly reducing labor supply because of this wealth effect.    
Another way Social Security might impact the labor supply of beneficiaries is 
through program rules that directly affect the wage rate of older workers.  The Retirement 
Earnings Test (RET) states that a Social Security old-age beneficiary may not earn more 
than a stipulated amount without having some of his or her Social Security benefits taxed 
away.  This test was in place for 62-to-69-year-olds until 2000.  It thus has the effect of 
holding down labor supply of the elderly.  In a life-cycle context, the Social Security 
system tends to steepen the age-labor supply profile for two reasons—the price of time is 
relatively higher when young (because of the RET) and wealth is relatively lower when 
young (because of exacerbated liquidity constraints).   
Further, Social Security forces workers to save more than they otherwise would.  
Workers must pay into the system while working, and receive a payout in the form of 
Social Security benefits from the system when retired.  Thus, with a Social Security 
system in place, individuals who were already liquidity constrained have the constraint 
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worsen because they are forced to save more than they would optimally.  Liquidity 
constrained persons would like to borrow from the future, but Social Security forces them 
to lend into the future.  For liquidity constrained persons, turning 62 is like receiving a 
scheduled helicopter drop of money they would have preferred to receive earlier in life.  
Thus, at age 62, one would expect liquidity constrained people to work much less.  The 
third chapter builds on this insight and includes the possibilities that spouses enjoy 
spending time together, i.e., there are complementarities in leisure, and that families pool 
their income, so shocks to either person’s income or wealth also affect the other person’s 
labor supply. 
  
II. Repeal of the Retirement Earnings Test 
 In the next chapter, I estimate the impact of the repeal of the Retirement Earnings 
Test on the labor supply of older people.  The repeal of the RET only applied to 
beneficiaries aged 65 through 69.  I evaluate the impact of the law using 70+-year-olds as 
my comparison group.  I use labor supply data from the basic monthly Current 
Population Survey (CPS) from 1997-2002 for white men aged 55-75 who are in the 
fourth month of the CPS survey.  I examine the impact from a lifecycle context, where 
workers can substitute labor supply intertemporally.  In a lifecycle context, the wage rate 
when young has fallen in relative terms, because a tax on working in old age, the RET, 
has been removed.  Thus, I would expect the age-labor supply profile to flatten, as 
younger workers work less, and older workers, namely the 65-to-69-year-olds, work 
more in response to the repeal.  Using both hours worked last week and employment last 
week as my dependent variables, my results confirm that 65-to-69-year-olds work more, 
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while the young cohort works less in response to the repeal.  I further find that the 
increase in labor supply by 65-to-69-year-olds is driven by an increase in full-time 
workers, while the share of part-time workers stays roughly constant.  This result 
suggests that the increase was driven by the repeal of the RET.  The RET does not 
discourage part-time work as much as full-time work as all workers could have earnings 
up to the same exempt amount.  Furthermore, the share of 65-to-69-year-old workers who 
receive Social Security benefits increased after the repeal, suggesting that those 65-to-69-
year-olds are not merely working longer in response to higher expected longevity or other 
reasons, but because of the repeal. 
 
III. Joint Retirement 
In the second paper, I investigate the joint retirement decisions of married 
couples.  While it is well known that one’s own age affects labor force participation 
discontinuously at ages 62 and 65, little is known about a wife’s labor supply when her 
husband reaches those ages.  When an older spouse, often the husband, becomes eligible 
for Social Security retirement benefits at age 62, liquidity constraints within the 
household are relaxed, and household wealth is increased.  If families pool income, either 
spouse turning 62 should relax liquidity constraints and affect the labor supply decisions 
of both spouses.  I include dummy variables for either spouse turning 62 and 65 and both 
spouses turning 62 and 65 in the equations for husband’s and wife’s labor supply in a 
probit model to account for this effect.  I find that there are not only the expected own-
age effects for turning 62 and 65, but also cross-age effects.  Those cross-age effects 
point to either complementarities in leisure or liquidity constraints as the reason for joint 
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retirement.  To test whether cross-age effects come from complementarities in leisure, I 
instrument for wages by including two dummy variables, one for whether the person is 
covered by age discrimination legislation, and one for whether his or her spouse is 
covered.  If the cross-age effects are driven by complementarities in leisure, then if age 
discrimination laws raise wages and thus the labor supply of older men, they should also 
raise the labor supply of their wives, whether or not the latter were covered (and vice 
versa).  I find that while age discrimination laws raise labor supply among older workers 
(as Neumark and Stock (1999) found) a husband’s coverage does not affect his wife’s 
labor supply (and vice versa).  This result suggests that complementarities in leisure are 
relatively modest and that the relaxing of liquidity constraints for either spouse affects the 





THE IMPACT OF THE REPEAL OF THE RETIREMENT EARNINGS TEST ON 
THE LABOR SUPPLY OF OLDER WORKERS 
 
I. Introduction 
 Until 2000, all Social Security beneficiaries under the age of 70 were covered by 
the Retirement Earnings Test (RET).  This less well-known provision of the Social 
Security Law stipulates that if an old-age beneficiary’s earnings exceed a certain exempt 
amount, his benefits were reduced.  The RET was included in the Social Security bill 
because the Social Security system was designed to provide economic security for the 
disabled, the unemployed, and the elderly.  It was thought that only those who suffered an 
economic loss in income due to old age were to receive retirement benefits.  Over time 
the RET has become less stringent.  In 1983, the RET was repealed for those aged 70 and 
above, and in 2000, the RET was repealed for all beneficiaries who had reached at least 
the Normal Retirement Age (NRA), which was 65 at the time. 
 Some might argue that there should be little impact on the labor supply of the 
elderly in response to the repeal because of the existence of the Delayed Retirement 
Credit (DRC).  The DRC increases the benefit amount if the worker delays claiming 
Social Security retirement benefits past the NRA.  A delay in claiming can be either 
voluntary or involuntary.  In the voluntary case, the worker does not start claiming until 
he is well past the NRA and receives credits for the months that he has waited.  In the 
involuntary case, the worker has some of his Social Security benefits taxed away due to 
the RET, and he receives credits for the months of Social Security benefits lost.  The 
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adjustment in benefits for delaying claiming Social Security started at one percent per 
year in 1972 and eventually will reach eight percent per year for those who turn 65 in 
2008.  The DRC was introduced as a measure of fairness to those who had to delay 
receipt of benefits because of the RET.  Depending on the individual’s life expectancy, 
the DRC might make the RET actuarially fair—beneficiaries would have to delay receipt 
of benefits but in return receive a higher benefit amount in the future. 
 However, individuals might still perceive the RET as a tax for a number of 
reasons.  First, the RET is a tax in a cross-sectional sense.  Furthermore, there is 
uncertainty over the time of death, so risk-averse individuals might prefer earlier receipt 
of a smaller benefit amount to later receipt of a larger benefit amount even if the values 
of the stream of benefits are equal in expected terms.  Moreover, liquidity constraints that 
would lead the individual to prefer benefit receipt now to later also make the RET a tax.  
In addition, the adjustment might not be actuarially fair for the average worker.  Finally, 
because of differences in life expectancies, even if the RET is actuarially fair for some 
workers, it might still not be fair for all of them. 
 Because it is unclear whether the RET should be viewed as a tax, it is not 
surprising that the literature on the impact of the Retirement Earnings Test on the labor 
supply of the elderly has produced mixed results.  In his survey, Leonesio (1990) notes 
“virtually all of [the] research [on the RET] indicates that the effect is probably small and 
that eliminating the test would have a minor impact on the work activity of older 
Americans."  However, in a more recent paper, Friedberg (2000) claims that this lack of 
an impact found should be attributed to a lack of innovation in the parameters of the RET 
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over the time period of earlier studies.  Friedberg finds that removing the RET would 
significantly increase labor supply of the affected group. 
 The repeal of the RET in 2000 is the “natural experiment” I exploit to analyze the 
impact of the Retirement Earnings Test on labor supply.  I estimate changes in the 
employment rate and hours worked using a differences-in-differences model to see how 
the elderly responded to this policy change.  This repeal is also a nice experiment that 
allows me to newly examine the impact Social Security rules have on the labor supply of 
the elderly. 
 The primary data for this paper is the Outgoing Rotation Groups (ORG) data on 
white men aged 55-75 in the fourth month of the Current Population Survey (CPS), from 
January 1996-December 2002.  I find that hours increase for the group targeted by the 
repeal, 65-to-69-year-olds, and decrease for younger workers.  Further, there is weaker 
evidence that the employment rate of the target group rises in response to the repeal, 
while the employment rate of younger workers decreases.  The increase in labor supply 
among the target group seems to be driven mostly by increases in labor supply among 65- 
and 66-year-olds.  In the presence of labor market transition costs, this finding suggests 
that the effect of the repeal on the target group might increase over time as those 65- and 
66-year-olds age.  
 
II. Brief History of the Retirement Earnings Test  
 Individuals can start claiming Social Security old-age benefits after they reach age 
62.  Benefit amounts depend on the worker’s earnings over his lifetime and his age at 
retirement.  The earlier a worker claims, the lower the benefit amount.  In addition to this 
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adjustment, the RET, a provision of the Social Security Law, stipulated that no benefits 
were to be paid to an old-age beneficiary who had “regular employment.”  Because the 
Social Security System was intended to be a social insurance program, retirement 
benefits were only to be received by those who had suffered a loss of income due to old 
age.  In 1939, Congress established earnings of $15 or more in a month as the amount 
that would constitute “regular employment.”  By 1950, the RET had come under 
increasing criticism.  Several problems were noted:  The “all-or-none” nature of the RET 
was deemed excessive.  A more gradual reduction in benefits was seen as more 
appropriate for workers who wanted to progress from full-time work to full retirement by 
way of part-time work.  Furthermore, some workers never retired and thus would never 
receive benefits, which seemed unfair, so there were efforts to make Social Security 
retirement benefits an annuity, payable upon attaining a particular age.   
These criticisms led to the gradual relaxation in the RET over time.  First, the 
amount of income that beneficiaries were allowed to earn without having their benefits 
reduced has been increasing over time.  Second, starting in 1954, beneficiaries aged 75 
and above were no longer subject to the RET.  Since then, increasingly younger 
beneficiaries have been exempted from the RET.  Third, since 1960, the rate at which 
benefits were reduced for earnings above the exempt amount has been repeatedly lowered 
(Dewitt (1999)). 
 In 1999, the year before the RET was repealed for beneficiaries who had reached 
at least the NRA, 62-to-64 were allowed annual earnings of up to $9,600.  For labor 
income above that amount, their Social Security benefits were reduced by $1 for each $2 
in excess of that amount, effectively resulting in a 50 percent marginal tax rate.  
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Beneficiaries 65 to 69 years old were allowed annual earnings of up to $15,500.  Income 
in excess of that amount resulted in a reduction of benefits by $1 for every $3 above the 
exempt amount, or a 33 percent marginal tax rate.  In 2000, the RET was repealed for the 
NRA cohort—those who were at least 65 years of age—abruptly dropping the marginal 
tax rate on excess income from 33 percent to zero for a large share of that cohort.   
 A counterpart to the RET, the Delayed Retirement Credit (DRC), was introduced 
in 1972.  The DRC increases a worker’s benefit amount for each month that he delays 
receipt of benefits past the NRA, which was 65 at the time.  When the DRC was first 
introduced, the benefit amount would increase by one percent for each year that the 
worker delayed receipt of Social Security benefits.  In 1977, the DRC was increased to 
three percent per year.  In 1983, Congress passed a law that set scheduled increases in the 
DRC, starting in 1990, and eventually increasing the DRC to eight percent per year.1   
 
III. Literature on the Effect of the Retirement Earnings Test on the Labor 
 Supply of Older Workers 
Until recently, the general consensus in academic research had been that the RET 
has little effect on labor supply.  Burtless and Moffitt (1985) developed a life-cycle 
model to jointly estimate the optimal retirement age and the hours of work immediately 
after retirement in the presence of the Social Security system and the earnings test.  They 
define retirement as a discontinuous drop in labor supply.  Estimating a life-cycle model 
via maximum likelihood estimator with panel data on men from the Retirement History 
Survey (RHS), they find the impact of Social Security benefits on retirement probabilities 
                                                          
1Information from Social Security Administration Website.  See Figures 2 and 3 
for changes in the RET exempt amount and the DRC. 
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grows with age.  First, examining the means, they find that retirement age clusters at age 
65, as expected.  Second, they also find that retirement working hours as a fraction of the 
hours worked needed to earn exactly the exempt amount clusters around 1, which is also 
expected.  Their identification in their model comes from variation in wages and assets.  
In their model, they incorporate three kinks—one from the point on where the federal 
income tax applies, and the other two arising from the retirement earnings test (one at the 
exempt amount and one at the point where all Social Security benefits have been “taxed” 
away due to excess earnings).  They do not account for changes in the marginal tax rate 
of the federal income tax, arguing that that effect is dominated by the “tax” on Social 
Security benefits that applies to excess earnings, rather holding it constant.  Their 
simulations show that eliminating the earnings test would not affect hours of work much 
and would leave the optimal retirement age virtually unchanged.  The authors also find 
that lowering benefits and increasing the normal retirement age would result in an 
increase in retirement age and hours of work.   While the model incorporates the life-
cycle aspect into it, jointly estimating age at retirement and post-retirement labor supply, 
they are estimating off limited variation in data that is quite dated. 
Leonesio (1990) argues that there are a number of factors that mitigate the impact 
of the RET on labor supply.  First, the DRC and benefit re-computation2 offset much of 
the loss due to the earnings test.  Second, the law has been relaxed over the years, so the 
elderly can earn substantial amounts before being subjected to benefit reductions.  Third, 
the group of affected persons is small enough to not make an impact on the aggregate 
                                                          
 2 Benefits are based on your Average Indexed Monthly Earnings.  The AIME 
takes into account the 35 highest-earning years, so if your earnings later in life are greater 
than early in life, you might replace some low-earning years with higher ones, thus 
increasing your Social Security benefits. 
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labor supply.  Fourth, many workers do not control the number of hours worked on the 
job, and thus reaction to changes in the law might be small in the short run.  Leonesio 
suggests that other factors, such as private pensions, Social Security benefit levels, health, 
job opportunities, family circumstances, and personal preferences are more important in 
determining the date of retirement than the RET.  His survey is unconvincing because he 
mostly appeals to rigidities that might hold down the effect in the short term, but he does 
not consider possible long term effects. 
 Honig and Reimers (1993) estimate the impact of the earnings test on labor 
supply by examining the re-entry behavior of older men who have retired from their 
career job.  The authors contend that if workers can choose their hours freely, the 
earnings test should not impact the labor force participation rate.  If workers earn more 
than the exempt amount, they can simply cut back on their hours to reduce their earnings 
to below the exempt amount.  One would expect to see a reduction in the number of 
hours worked as workers perceive the RET as a tax, but there is no reason to expect that 
workers will drop out of the labor market entirely.  However, in estimating a hazard 
model of re-entry into the labor force after retirement, they find that “older men perceive 
a discontinuity in the budget constraint” driven by fixed costs to working.  Moreover, 
older workers act myopically with regard to the RET.  Identification comes from 
variation in wages and other income and wealth.  They do not account for the DRC and 
thus act as if there were a kink at the exempt income amount.  As the authors note, 
myopia alone should not affect labor force participation, merely the number of work 
hours.  Thus, their results imply myopia, a lack of good part-time jobs, and large fixed 
costs to labor market re-entry.  Furthermore, using simulations, they find that the 
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scheduled increases in the DRC that passed as part of the Social Security Amendments of 
1983 would not affect older men’s retirement behavior.  Instead, increasing the exempt 
amount would more effectively accomplish the goal of stimulating labor supply among 
the elderly than increasing the DRC.  While the results are quite convincing, the study 
suffers from the lack of scope—the design allows the authors to examine re-entry 
behavior since retirement from a career job only, not the labor supply behavior of men 
still on their career job. 
 Friedberg (2000) examined whether changes in the RET exempt amount over 
time altered labor supply of the affected age group.  She finds that earnings of older 
workers bunch just below the exempt amount for their respective age group, suggesting 
that workers are aware of the exempt amount and that they try to stay below that 
threshold.  Furthermore, she shows that the clustering spot moves when the exempt 
amount changes.  This evidence suggests that the RET reduces labor supply.  She also 
estimates that eliminating the RET at age 65 would increase the average hours worked by 
5.3 percent for beneficiaries in the 65-to-69 age group who are at or above the kink in the 
budget constraint.  Her identification strategy involves exploiting the variation in wages 
and assets to estimate the impact on hours worked, using a model with a kinked budget 
constraint, where the only tax is the reduction in Social Security benefits due to excess 
earnings.  Because she relies on the variation from wages, she can only estimate the 
effect on those already at work.  Therefore, her model does not account for beneficiaries 
who might now enter the labor force.  She argues that previous studies on the effect of the 
RET are outdated and rely on data from the 1970's, a period with little change in the 
RET.  Using recent CPS data, she finds that the labor supply of older workers is sensitive 
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to the RET.  It should be noted that she treats the RET as a mere reduction in benefits, 
ignoring the actuarial adjustment in future benefits via the DRC.   
Gruber and Orszag (2000) use data from the March Supplement CPS for 1974-
1999 and find that there are small labor supply responses among males to changes in the 
RET exempt amount, the tax on benefits, and the DRC.  They estimate a simple reduced 
form model and find that when linear and quadratic age-specific time-trends are included 
as independent variables, changes in the RET law such as increasing exempt amounts 
have no effect on labor supply.  However, they do find that changes in the law have 
affected the labor supply of women.  Their findings also indicate that removing the RET 
might increase earlier claiming of Social Security benefits among both men and women.  
Their study unfortunately suffers from a lack of variation in the data necessary to find 
any responses in a cross-sectional model.  The result among women might be attributable 
to a general upward trend in female labor supply. 
 Pingle (2002) uses the 1985 to 1996 panels of the Survey of Income and Program 
Participation to examine the impact of raising the DRC over this time period.  He finds 
that the changes in the DRC do affect labor supply, although those changes seem 
restricted to individuals near the age of 65.   Using the actual DRC amount to identify its 
effect on the labor supply of those around 65 years of age, he finds a significant and large 
effect, using a linear trend for birth year cohort.  However, the result is sensitive to the 
specification of the trend term. 
 What is missing in the literature is a study of what happened when the RET was 
repealed for a large portion of Social Security beneficiaries.  This chapter attempts to fill 
that gap.  One major weakness previous studies suffered from was the lack of variation in 
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RET rules that they could employ in their analysis.  In addition, the studies also suffered 
from selection bias in that they could only observe a limited sample (for example, those 
that re-entered the labor force or those that were working even before the repeal).  In 
addition, they all had to rely on out-of-sample predictions in their analysis because the 
repeal had not taken place yet.  The repeal of the RET in 2000 is a “natural experiment” 
that allows me to re-examine the issue. 
 
IV. The Retirement Earnings Test as a Tax in the Life-Cycle Context    
Whether the repeal of the RET has an impact on labor supply depends on whether 
or not the RET is a tax on earnings.  In this section, I aim to demonstrate the manner in 
which the RET operates as a tax because I wish to treat the repeal of the RET as an 
income tax cut.  In a cross-sectional sense, the RET is obviously a tax—workers lose 
benefits they would otherwise receive because they earn more than the exempt amount of 
income.  However, it is more appropriate to examine the RET from a life-cycle 
perspective.  In 1999, if the earnings of a Social Security beneficiary who had reached the 
NRA of 65 were above a specified exempt amount of earnings, his Social Security 
benefits were “taxed” at a 33 percent rate.3  However, future benefits are adjusted via the 
Delayed Retirement Credit.  If the future adjustment is actuarially fair and there are no 
liquidity constraints or risk aversion by individuals, the RET is not a tax in a life-cycle 
context and it should have no effect on the labor supply of 65-to-69-year-olds.  On the 
                                                          
3 The worker can be on any of three segments of his budget constraint before the 
repeal.  He can earn below the exempt amount and thus receive full Social Security 
benefits, and face a zero marginal tax rate due to the RET.  Further, he can earn more 
than the exempt amount, but receive partial Social Security benefits, and thus face a 33 
percent marginal tax rate due to the RET.  Finally, he can earn so much in excess of the 
exempt amount that all of his Social Security benefits are taxed away by the RET, and 
thus again face a zero marginal tax rate due to the RET. 
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other hand, if the actuarial adjustment is not fair, and thus the expected value of the 
lifetime stream of Social Security benefits decreases, the RET always acts as a tax for 
some individuals.   
 With a known mortality date, one can calculate the value of the stream of Social 
Security benefits a worker will accumulate over his lifetime, conditional on when he 
starts claiming Social Security in the absence of the RET.  Thus, one can determine when 
a worker should start claiming so as to maximize the stream of Social Security benefits.  I 
will conduct just this exercise assuming zero inflation4 and no changes in the Average 
Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME)5 upon which the amount of Social Security benefits is 
based.  Furthermore, I consider only the worker’s own Social Security benefits, not the 
secondary benefits a spouse might draw.  Additionally, I make the simplifying 
assumption that workers start claiming at either age 62, 65, or 70 only.  I choose these 
three ages because age 62 is the earliest age at which one can start claiming benefits, 65 
is the Normal Retirement Age now, and it is not rational to start claiming after age 70 
because one cannot accrue Delayed Retirement Credits past age 70.  Note that the results 
I find are irrespective of the earnings level of the beneficiary under the above 
assumptions.  I find that for a man who knows that he will die before age 77, claiming at 
age 62 maximizes his lifetime Social Security benefits.  Moreover, assuming the DRC is 
five percent, only a worker who will die at age 90 or older would want to delay claiming 
benefits until age 70 in order to maximize the value of his stream of Social Security 
                                                          
4 Although that is accounted for by the Cost Of Living Adjustments (COLA). 
 
5 Changes are minimal.  A case in which a worker replaces two years of average 
pay ($2,683 in 2002) with high pay ($4,145 in 2002) results in the monthly Primary 
Insurance Amount (PIA) increasing from $1,559 to $1,570.  The monthly PIA is the 
amount of monthly benefits received by a beneficiary who retired at the Normal 
Retirement Age. 
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benefits.  Thus, for anyone who knows that he will die before age 90 and who earns an 
income between the ages of 65 and 69 that substantially exceeds the exempt amount, the 
RET acts as a tax because the adjustment in future benefits is not actuarially fair. 
Having shown that for an individual with a low life expectancy the RET is a tax in 
a life-cycle context with no borrowing constraints and with certainty about the time of 
death, it follows that the RET is always a tax if the individual dies at a sufficiently young 
age.  Borrowing constraints, myopic viewpoints, and risk aversion exacerbate the effect 
of the tax further.  Moreover, those three factors can lead individuals to perceive and 
experience the RET as a tax even if the adjustment via the DRC is actuarially fair. 
 Therefore, the repeal of the RET is an income tax cut in a life-cycle context even 
for risk-neutral individuals who face no liquidity constraints if they die at a sufficiently 
young age.6  Beneficiaries aged 65-69 who work at the moment and who are subject to 
liquidity constraints or for whom the adjustment via the DRC is not actuarially fair 
perceive this repeal as an income tax cut.  I would expect this tax cut to spur those aged 
65-69 to work more because I believe the substitution effect dominates the income effect, 
especially at lower levels of income.  The income effect should be relatively small at 
lower earnings levels.  In fact, for beneficiaries aged 65-69 who do not work at all, the 
income effect is zero at the margin because if a worker earned less than the exempt 
amount prior to the repeal, the RET did not effectively tax him, so there is no income 
                                                          
6 Note that those who are most affected are those receiving partial Social Security 
benefits.  Those who have all their benefits taxed away face essentially a lump-sum tax, 
so they experience only an income effect.  Those who earn below the exempt amount 
should not be affected, as their marginal tax rate has not changed, and they do not 
experience an income effect, either.  However, in the presence of discontinuities in the 
budget set, the latter might experience a substitution effect. 
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effect.  Therefore, I would expect individuals aged 65-69 to increase labor supply in 
response to the repeal. 
 
A.  When to Start Claiming Social Security Benefits  
With perfect information and no liquidity constraints, the optimal age to start 
claiming Social Security benefits depends on one’s time of death (TD).  In the following 
illustration, I make the simplifying assumption that workers only claim at ages 62, 65, 
and 70.  Also, only retired workers’ own benefits are considered, not spouse’s or other 
secondary benefits that might factor into the decision on when to start claiming benefits.  
Assuming there is no discounting and that there are no changes in the AIME amount due 
to the replacing of lower-earnings years with higher ones, the answer comes down to the 
following:  80*(TD-62)>100*(TD-65)?7 
 If the inequality holds, claiming early (at age 62) is better than waiting until one 
reaches the NRA.  This statement is true if TD<77.  Factoring in discount rates moves the 
maximum TD up.  However, if there are no liquidity constraints, this factor should not 
matter given COLA.  Factoring in a higher AIME due to benefit re-computation moves 
the maximum TD down, but the AIME should not change much for most workers.  Next, 
considering the question of whether a worker should start claiming at age 65 or age 70 is 
the same as asking oneself if the following inequality is true, assuming the DRC is five 
percent:  100*(TD-65)>125*(TD-70)? 
 If this inequality holds, claiming at age 65 is better than claiming at the latest 
possible (while still rational) date, age 70, as workers may not accrue additional Delayed 
                                                          
7 Receive 80% of the PIA for (TD-62) years if you claim at age 62, or receive 
100% of PIA for (TD-65) years 
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Retirement Credits after age 70.  This inequality holds if TD<90.  Thus, for all workers 
whose TD is less than 90 years (at a DRC of five percent per year), the RET acts as a tax, 
as benefits are only partially replaced.8  I show what the expected value of the stream of 
SS benefits is, not accounting for discounting, in a simple numerical example, where a 
worker’s annual PIA is 100, conditional on his time of death in Table 3.1.  Clearly the 
RET acts as a tax for many workers and it should not be surprising that the repeal of the 
RET should have an effect on the labor supply of the affected age group (see Figure 1 for 
a graphical illustration of this exercise).9 
 
B. What About Spouse’s Benefits? 
Note that the DRC does not increase spouse's benefits.  If a worker in my sample 
of white men is married and his wife receives spouse’s benefits, the RET is more likely to 
act as a tax for him in a family decision-making context than if he were single.  Assuming 
the primary earner is a man who retired at the NRA or later and his wife receives spouse's 
benefits, the wife receives 50 percent of the Primary Insurance Amount (PIA)10 if she 
starts claiming at her NRA or later.  Her benefit amount is adjusted downward if she 
starts claiming earlier.  If the NRA is 65 and she starts claiming at age 62, she receives 75 
percent of 50 percent, 37.5 percent, of her husband’s PIA, assuming he retired after 
                                                          
8 Indeed, even at 6.5 percent per year, assuming a discount rate of zero and 
adjustments in the AIME, TD>85(85.4, to be precise) for workers to not perceive the 
RET as a tax. 
 
9 Note that although the DRC eventually reaches 8 percent, I cannot repeat these 
simple exercises as easily because by the time the DRC is 8 percent, the NRA will have 
increased to 67+ years. 
 
10 The PIA is the benefit amount that, in this case, a retired worker receives 
monthly if he retires at the Normal Retirement Age (NRA).  The annual PIA refers to the 
benefit amount a retired worker receives annually if he retires at the NRA. 
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attaining the NRA.  On the other hand, if the husband delays retirement until age 70 and 
the wife does not claim until she has attained at least her NRA, she still receives only 
50% of his PIA, not 50% of his benefit amount as adjusted via the DRC.  However, if the 
husband dies, the widow receives his full benefit amount, including the adjustment via 
the DRC. 
For example, consider a 65-year-old married man whose earnings in 1999 are 
$42,500, $27,000 over the exempt amount of $15,500, and whose 65-year-old wife draws 
spouse’s benefits, and they both started claiming after attaining the NRA.  Then, the 
family’s Social Security benefits are reduced by a total of $9,000, one-third of $27,000.  
His benefits are reduced by $6,000 and his wife's are reduced by $3,000.  Assuming his 
annual PIA is $12,000 and he retired at the NRA, he is considered to have lost six 
months’ worth of benefits ($6,000 is 6/12 of his annual PIA, $12,000).  Thus, he receives 
a credit of 5.5*(6/12) = 2.75 percent (with the DRC at 5.5 percent per year) for losing six 
months’ worth of Social Security benefits.  However, the loss in his wife's spouse's 
benefits is not replaced.  She continues to receive spouse’s benefits of 50 percent of his 
PIA ($12,000), $6,000, rather than 50 percent of what her husband now receives, 
1.0275*PIA (12,330), $6,165.   
 
C. How Much Money was Taxed Away by the RET Prior to its Repeal? 
Here I calculate the expected value of the stream of Social Security benefits for a 
typical white male at age 62 conditional on when he first claims, using life tables from 
1999 (see Table 3.2.).  To simplify the calculation, I assume that workers claim only at 
exact ages in years, e.g. they may claim at exactly 62 years of age but not at 62 years and 
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3 months, and that full annual benefits are received at the end of each year.  I find that an 
average white male maximizes the value by first claiming benefits at age 65 with a DRC 
of five percent per year.  For the average white male who would want to start claiming at 
age 65, being forced to delay receipt of any Social Security benefits until age 70 is 
equivalent to having about 12 percent of his lifetime Social Security benefits taxed away 
(see Table 3.1.).  This finding suggests that for the average white male, the RET is a tax.  
The actual tax rate depends on his lifetime earnings profile and life expectancy.  Note that 
this statement does not imply that the tax affects the average white male, as he might or 
might not choose to work past age 65, even in the absence of the RET. 
To put a dollar figure on this loss, note that the mean annual PIA in the middle 
quintile of PIA’s was $11,700 in 2000.  The annual PIA is the amount of benefits a 
retired worker receives annually if he retires at the Normal Retirement Age, 65 at the 
time.  Thus, for the average white male, assuming he had about average earnings11 
throughout his life, the difference in being able to start claiming and receiving benefits at 
age 65 and being forced to defer receipt of benefits until age 70 was $21,539.70—he 
received $152,404.20 instead of the $173,943.90 he would have received if he had been 
allowed to receive his full benefits from age 65 on.   
 
V. Expected Economic Consequences of the Repeal of the RET 
Absent liquidity constraints and risk aversion and if there is no Retirement 
Earnings Test in place, a worker will start claiming Social Security benefits at the age 
where the expected present value of the stream of Social Security benefits is maximized.  
The labor supply decision will be made independently from the decision about when to 
                                                          
11 Here, “average” refers to the average beneficiary, not the average white male. 
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start claiming.  Without the RET, there is no limit on earnings even when benefits are 
claimed, so there is no link between the labor supply decision and the decision about 
when to start claiming benefits.12 
With a RET in place, however, one would expect two things to happen:  a 
reduction in labor supply at the ages where the RET applies, and an increase in labor 
supply at other ages,13 assuming the RET acts as a tax.  The intuition behind this 
prediction is that because of the tax on working from age 62 to age 69, there is a 
substitution effect that leads to people working more when they are paid relatively more.  
There is also an income effect that induces individuals to work more over their lifetime 
because lifetime wealth has decreased.  The size of this effect depends on the effective 
tax rate of the RET. 
  After the repeal of the RET, labor supply at the ages for which it has been 
repealed should increase, as relative wages have risen for those groups (substitution 
effect).  The income effect would tend to reduce lifetime labor supply, but it would not 
necessarily result in exit from the labor force, but rather should result in decreased 
intensity, e.g., reduced hours. 
                                                          
12 I abstract from the income effect from Social Security benefits that might arise 
because of liquidity constraints.  With liquidity constraints, it could be rational to start 
claiming at an age that does not maximize the present value of the stream of Social 
Security benefits. 
 
13 Absent labor force transition costs.  With labor market entry/exit costs, one 
would expect labor supply to drop after the ages for which the RET applies as well.  If 
the affected age range for the RET is 62-69, then, in the absence of labor market 
entry/exit costs, one would expect labor supply to rise before age 62 and after age 69.  
However, with labor force transition costs present, it is possible that one finds that labor 
supply after age 69 also declines because workers who exit the labor market prior to age 
69 find it too costly to re-enter the labor market. 
 24
The RET did not apply to a worker who is 70 or older even prior to 2000, so the 
repeal of the RET has no effect on workers in that age group if it was unanticipated.  
Thus, workers aged 70 and older would be a suitable comparison group in the time period 
immediately after the repeal, as long as the repeal was unexpected.  Any change in their 
labor supply is not a result of the repeal of the RET. 
A worker between the ages of 65 and 69 experiences an income effect if he had 
some of his benefits taxed away prior to the repeal because this tax cut increases his 
lifetime wealth, which in return depresses lifetime labor supply.  However, at the same 
time, the reduction in the marginal tax rate from 33 percent to zero for some workers also 
means that there is a substitution effect working in the opposite direction.  The return to 
working has increased, which spurs labor supply.  The likely net result is an increase in 
labor supply because the income effect is likely to be minimal unless the worker had 
substantial earnings before the repeal.  If the worker was not working at all or had labor 
income below the exempt amount, there is no income effect because he was not taxed 
prior to the repeal.   
For a worker younger than age 65, income and substitution effects work in the 
same direction.  The income effect that arises if the worker was going to earn more than 
the exempt amount between the ages of 65 and 69 results in lower lifetime labor supply.  
Further, working between the ages of 65 and 69 becomes relatively more attractive than 
before the repeal because compensation at those ages has increased in relative terms, so 
there is a substitution effect that induces a reduction in labor supply before age 65. 
One way to examine the effect on labor supply is to examine the change in the 
employment rate.  One would expect more 65-to-69-year-olds at work and fewer younger 
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workers at work in any given week, while the old group, aged 70 and older, should be 
unaffected by the repeal and thus make a good comparison group.  Additionally, hours 
should decrease for younger workers (ages 55-64), increase for the group that is affected 
(ages 65-69), and not change as a result of the repeal for the oldest workers (ages 70+).   
Labor market entry/exit costs might also affect the behavior exhibited by workers.  
If entry costs into the labor market are high, once workers retire, many do not re-enter the 
labor market, even after the repeal.  Instead, the increase in the employment rate of 65-to-
69-year-olds would come about because workers stay in the labor force longer.  One 
would observe an increase in the rate at which workers stay in the labor force, but one 
would not necessarily find an increase in the rate of labor market entry. 
 
VI. Econometric Model 
As I argued in the previous section, different groups will react in different ways to 
the repeal of the RET.  First, those aged 64 and younger are expected to reduce labor 
supply in response to the repeal.  I split that group into those aged 61 and younger, the 
young group, and those aged 62 to 64, the intermediate group.  These two groups differ in 
that 62-to-64-year-olds may claim Social Security retirement benefits subject to the RET 
while those younger than age 62 may not.  Thus, the effects for those two groups might 
differ.  An additional reason why those two groups should be treated separately is that 
when the RET was repealed for those who had attained the NRA in 2000, which was 65 
at the time, there were two other major changes for Social Security beneficiaries who had 
not yet attained the NRA but would reach the NRA in a given calendar year:  the exempt 
amount was substantially increased and the marginal tax rate on earnings in excess of the 
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exempt amount was lowered from 50 percent to about 33 percent.  Thus, it is not clear 
whether those aged 62 to 64 as a whole increase or decrease labor supply.  Those aged 65 
to 69, the target group, are expected to increase labor supply in response to the repeal (see 
Table 3.2. for an illustration of income and substitution effects for each of the three 
groups).   
The data I have for my model are individual level data on age, educational 
attainment, race, gender, hours worked last week, labor force status last week, and date of 
survey.  I opt to estimate a differences-in-differences model with the old group, those 
aged 70 and older, as my comparison group.  The old group does not experience a change 
in response to the repeal because they were already exempt from the RET prior to 2000.  
The equation I estimate is the following: 
Yit = f0 + (Target Group)it ftarget + (Young Group)it fyoung     (1) 
+ (Intermediate Group)it fintermediate + ∑j=31 to 46 Edui,j fedu,j  
+ ∑k=55 to 75 Agei,k fage,k + ∑l=1997 to 2002 Yeart,l fyear,l  
+ ∑m=1 to 12 Montht,m fmonth,m + εit    
Yit is a measure of labor supply for individual i at time t.  I use both an indicator variable 
for whether an individual worked last week and hours worked last week as a labor supply 
measure.  The treatment variables are (Target Group)it, which equals 1 if the respondent 
is between 65 and 69 years of age and the year is 2000 or later, 0 otherwise, (Young 
Group)it, which equals 1 if the respondent is younger than or equal to 61 years of age and 
the year is 2000 or later, 0 otherwise, and (Intermediate Group)it, which equals 1 if the 
respondent is between 62 and 64 years of age and the year is 2000 or later, 0 otherwise.  
∑jEdui,j is a set of dummy variables for educational attainment.  ∑kAgei,k is a set of 
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dummy variables for age in years, ∑lYeart,l is a set of dummy variables for year of 
survey, and ∑mMontht,m is a set of dummy variables for month of survey.  εit is assumed a 
normally distributed error term. 
As shown earlier, workers with a short life expectancy are most affected by the 
RET and should modify their labor supply the most in response to the repeal of the RET.  
Unfortunately, I do not observe a person’s life expectancy in the CPS data, so I cannot 
control for life expectancy directly.  However, Kitagawa and Hauser (1968) find that 
there is a strong inverse relationship between educational attainment and mortality among 
white males.  More recently, Christenson and Johnson (1995) confirmed this result using 
actual data from death certificates after education was added to the U.S. death certificate.   
Further, Hurd and McGarry (1995) find that not only do low-educated individuals 
die younger, they also expect to die younger (Table 3.5.).  Using data from the Health and 
Retirement Study (HRS), the authors find that individuals’ subjective life expectancies 
vary according to various risk factors in the same direction macro data predicts those risk 
factors to act.  Hurd and McGarry’s findings include low-educated respondents’ knowing 
that their mortality rate is higher than that of higher-educated individuals.   
Thus, because low-educated individuals know that they die younger, and the RET 
taxes those who die young the most, low-educated workers should react most strongly to 
the repeal of the RET.  One might argue that low-educated workers might not understand 
that their lower life expectancy makes the RET more of a tax for them than for higher-
educated workers.  However, low-educated workers are also more likely to perceive the 
RET as a tax if one makes the assumption that they are also less informed about Social 
Security law, and might, in fact, not know about the DRC.  In addition, low-educated 
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workers are more likely to be subject to liquidity constraints and thus perceive the RET 
as a tax. 
Therefore, I also run equation (1) with subsamples where I take workers from one 
of two groups:  those who have a high school diploma or less, and those who have a 
college degree or more.  The former is expected to change labor supply more drastically 
than the latter.  I again use employment and hours as my measures of labor supply. 
Finally, I would like to determine whether the change in the employment rate 
came about because of change in entry into the labor force, change in exit from the labor 
force, or change in continuation in the labor force.  Entry indicates that a person was not 
at work last year but is at work now.  Exit indicates that a person was at work last year 
but is not at work now.  Continuation indicates that a person was at work last year and is 
still at work.  For this last set of regressions, I use entry, exit, and continuation as my 
measures of labor supply in equation (1). 
 The parameters I estimate via my differences-in-differences model are the initial 
responses to the repeal of the RET.  Note that as I add more data in a few years, this same 
analysis could not be done because 70+-year-olds would no longer be a suitable 
comparison group.  Those 70+-year-olds would have been affected by the repeal earlier 
when they were still 65 years old, so 70+-year-olds will not be a suitable comparison 
group in the future any more. 
 
A. Notes on the Comparison Group 
There is some concern over whether 70+-year-olds are a suitable comparison 
group.  In fact, 70+-year-olds probably behave very differently from the young group.  A 
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differences-in-differences model has several drawbacks:  Among the young, it might 
understate the effect, absent general equilibrium effects.  For example, one might believe 
that the change in the labor market environment captured by the comparison group of 
70+-year-olds understates the change among the 55-to-61-year-olds because the latter are 
more flexible and can react more strongly to positive changes in the labor market 
environment.  If the labor market situation among the elderly improves, as it did as 
evidenced by the increase in labor force participation among 70+-year-olds, the young 
might benefit more than 70+-year-olds.  In that case, the effect captured by the model is 
too small, and a lower bound on the real effect.  However, if there are general equilibrium 
effects at work here, then increased labor supply by 70+-year-olds could lower demand 
for labor by 55-to-61-year-olds even with no repeal of the RET.  General equilibrium 
effects are probably small, however, considering that few 70+-year-olds work.  Overall, if 
I find that the young decrease their labor supply, the result is probably a lower bound on 
the true effect. 
Further, 70+-year-olds are probably still slightly different from 65-to-69-year-
olds, for two reasons.  First, they are a little older.  Second, under Social Security rules it 
might be optimal to claim anytime from age 65-69, depending on the DRC amount and 
changes in the AIME, but it can never be optimal to claim after age 70, so all eligible 
70+-year-olds should have claimed and should currently receive Social Security 
retirement benefits.  Again, assuming that the change in the labor market environment 
captured by the comparison group of 70+-year-olds understates the change among the 65-
to-69-year-olds, this time the results represent the upper bound on the coefficients.  As 
70+-year-olds increase labor supply, 65-to-69-year-olds probably increase it even more, 
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even absent the repeal.  On the other hand, the general equilibrium story would point in 
the opposite direction—as 70+-year-olds worked more, they made the effect of the repeal 
appear smaller than it really is.  Overall, the effect on the labor supply of 65-to-69-year-
olds might not be quite as large as the results would indicate. 
 
B. Caveats with a Differences-in-Differences Model 
 One problem that might arise from using a differences-in-differences model is 
that I am imposing a linear structure on the effect.  Essentially, the underlying assumption 
is that each age group experiences a change in the intercept in response to the repeal.  The 
intercept is assumed not to change for the comparison group, but all other coefficients are 
assumed constant.  This assumption might be too restrictive, especially when I find that 
breaking up the target group by individual ages gives me different effects for different 
ages.   
In addition, the differences-in-differences model captures some unspecified 
average effect for each treatment group.  In reality, each individual treatment group 
contains a great deal of heterogeneity because each individual faces a different effective 
tax rate from the RET due to differing life expectancies and lifetime earnings profiles.  
Further, it matters greatly where a worker is situated on his budget constraint.  Even in a 
simplified case where the RET is the only tax that is applied to a worker’s earnings, there 
are three different segments a worker can be located at along his budget constraint.  He 
could be on the first segment, earn less than the exempt amount, receive his full Social 
Security benefits, and face a zero marginal tax rate.  Alternatively, he could be located on 
the second segment, face a marginal tax rate between zero and 33 percent, depending on 
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his life expectancy and other factors, and receive part of his Social Security benefits.  
Finally, he could be located on the third segment, face a zero marginal tax rate and 
receive no Social Security benefits.14  Workers on each segment experience different 
effects.  At first glance, workers on the first segment face a change only in an irrelevant 
part of their budget set as they are in the region where their marginal tax rate was already 
zero before the repeal.  However, if workers are not be able to choose the exact desired 
amount of hours worked, they might experience the repeal as a tax cut.  Workers on the 
second segment could theoretically increase or decrease labor supply, though the 
substitution effect should dominate for most of them.  On the one hand, there is a large 
substitution effect as the marginal tax rate jumps from 33 percent to zero, inducing an 
increase in labor supply.  At the same time, those workers can now claim full benefits 
while working, so there is also an income effect, lowering labor supply, though that effect 
should be rather small.  Workers on the third segment experience purely an income 
effect.  Their marginal tax rates stay unchanged, but now they can claim full benefits at 
the same time.   
While it is arguable that workers on the first and second segment are probably 
quite similar in their response to the repeal, workers on the third segment behave entirely 
differently.  In reality, the effect captured by my model is a weighted average of workers 
on those three segments, where I do not know the weights, and the effect I find is really a 
lower bound on the effect of the repeal on the first and second segment, tempered by the 
negative effect on those on the third segment.  Among 65-to-69-year-olds, I estimate that 
                                                          
14 He could also be on either of two kinks, either facing a 33 percent marginal tax 
rate and still receiving full benefits or facing a zero marginal tax rate and receiving no 
benefits as on segment three. 
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between 8.5 percent and 13 percent were on the second segment before the repeal, while 
between 3.5 percent and 8 percent of them were located on the third segment.15   
 
VII. Data Set 
 I use data from the Outgoing Rotation Groups (ORG) from the Current Population 
Survey (CPS) from January 1996-December 2002.  The CPS is a monthly survey of 
about 50,000 households conducted by the Census Bureau for the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics.  The sample is representative of the noninstitutionalized civilian population.  
The CPS interviews households the same four months in a two-year period.  Households 
in the fourth and eighth months are part of the ORG, and contain detailed data on 
earnings.  Observations from the fourth (eighth) month in the CPS will be referred to as 
ORG 1 (ORG 2).  The two dependent variables I use from the CPS are hours worked last 
week and a discrete indicator that equals 1 if a person is at work and 0 otherwise.   
My sample includes white men aged 55-75 in the fourth month of the CPS.  Age 
in the CPS is age in years in the interview week.  This imprecise measure is unfortunate 
because Social Security rules are contingent on exact age.  The only sample restriction is 
that none of the white men in my sample be disabled, so only persons for whom working 
is a choice variable are included.  When I eliminate the disabled, my sample size is 
reduced from 76,864 to 71,311. 
Table 2.5.2. presents means of work and hours variables for observations on ORG 
1 before the repeal and after the repeal.  From that table, I can see that both the 
employment rate and hours worked are much higher after the repeal than before the 
                                                          
15 Those numbers are based on the annual PIA using March Supplement CPS data 
1996-2002. 
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repeal for 65-to-69-year-olds.  My test for whether the repeal of the RET changed labor 
supply behavior among the elderly is to compare employment rates and hours worked for 
workers aged 55-75 before and after the repeal. 
For the equations where I use employment and hours worked as my measures of 
labor supply, I use observations from ORG 1 of the CPS.  For the equations where I use 
entry, exit, and continuation as my measures of labor supply, I use observations from 
ORG 2 of the CPS because I know whether those individuals were at work a year ago or 
not, and can construct entry, exit, and continuation variables.  Sample 2 consists of ORG 
2 observations from January 1997-December 2002.  Note that Sample 2 contains 56-76-
year olds, so the young group consists of 56-61-year-olds, and the comparison group 
consists of 70-76-year-olds for this sample. 
I construct two different samples containing observations from ORG 1.  The first 
ORG 1 sample, Sample 1A, spans January 1996-December 2001 and together with 
Sample 2 builds my panel from which I can construct entry, exit, and continuation 
variables.  I match individuals across time by household identification number, line 
number, race, and sex.  Attrition does not seem to be too big a problem in my panel, as I 
retain 59,127 observations for Sample 2 of originally 68,204 observations in Sample 1A.  
Table 2.6. shows the means in ORG 1 for those who attrit from the sample and those who 
do not.   
The other ORG 1 sample, Sample 1B, spans January 1997-December 2002.  
Sample 1B is used to test the effect of the RET on hours worked last week and 
employment last week.  Its advantage over Sample 2 is that attrition is much lower from 




Table 2.7. shows the results from a simple before-after means test.  I find that 
employment of 62-to-64-year-olds and 65-to-69-year-olds increased by a statistically 
significant 2.34 and 3.39 percentage points, respectively, after the repeal.  On the other 
hand, employment of 55-to-61-year-olds remained unchanged, and while employment 
was higher post-repeal among 70-to-75-year-olds, the difference is only marginally 
significant.  Looking at hours, 65-to-69-year-olds worked more hours after the repeal, as 
did 70-to-75-year-olds.  On the other hand, the increase in hours among 62-to-64-year-
olds and the decrease in hours among 55-61-year-olds are only marginally significant. 
Tables 2.8.1.-2.8.5. present results for equation (1) with employment as the labor 
supply measure using Sample 1B in a probit model.  Here, as I do subsequently for the 
probit models, I report the mean of the marginal effect for each coefficient.  I estimate 
models for the full sample and two subsamples, limited to those who have attained at 
most a high school diploma and those who have at least a four-year college degree, 
respectively.  I use the subsamples to examine whether the low-educated react more 
strongly to the repeal than the high-educated.  Recall that the low-educated know that 
their life expectancy is shorter than that of the high-educated, so the RET affects them the 
most. I find that among the control covariates, older age is associated with lower labor 
supply across all education groups.  In addition, employment tends to increase in 
education, both unsurprising results.   
As shown in Table 2.8.4., in the full sample, the results suggest that 65-to-69-
year-olds increase employment by 2.21 percentage points and the coefficient is 
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statistically significant.  In addition, 55-to-61-year-olds reduce employment by 1.60 
percentage points, but the coefficient is only marginally significant in the probit model.  
Among the low-educated, those workers who should react more strongly to the repeal, 
only the coefficient for the target group is statistically significant, suggesting that they 
increase employment by 3.31 percentage points.  Among the high-educated, only the 
coefficient on the young is statistically significant, suggesting that they reduce 
employment by 4.00 percentage points.  
Table 2.8.5. presents the results again with equation (1) using employment as a 
measure of labor supply with Sample 1B, but now the target group has been broken up 
into individual age groups to see if 65- and 66-year-olds are more affected by the repeal 
than 67-to-69-year-olds.  Again, I estimate probit models for the full sample and 
subsamples by educational attainment.  If there are labor force transition costs and entry 
is costly, I would expect 65- and 66-year-olds to increase labor supply much more than 
67-to-69-year-olds.  65- and 66-year-olds are more likely to still be in the labor force and 
thus less likely to have transition costs imposed on them, so it is less costly for them to 
increase labor supply.  Indeed, I find that while there is no increase in the employment 
rate for 66-to-69-year olds, 65-year-olds increase their employment rate by a statistically 
significant 4.91 percentage points in response to the repeal.  Among the low-educated, I 
find that 65-, 67-, and 68-year-olds increase employment.  By 5.93, 4.55, and 5.25 
percentage points, respectively, and all but the coefficient for 67-year-olds is statistically 
significant, and that one is marginally significant.  The results in a linear model are 
similar and are presented in Tables 2.9.1.-2.9.5. 
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Using hours as my dependent variable, I again find that labor supply is decreasing 
in age and decreasing in education.  In Tables 2.10.1.-2.10.5., I present results for 
equation (1) using hours worked last week as my measure of labor supply with Sample 
1B.  Recall that in a life-cycle context younger workers should reduce their hours if they 
expect to increase hours between the ages of 65 and 69.  I estimate models using a linear 
specification for the full sample and subsamples by educational attainment.  In the full 
sample, I find that the target group has increased hours worked by a statistically 
significant 0.98 hours a week.  The number might seem small at first, but the average 
hours worked by the target group before the repeal is a mere 9.09 hours a week, so this 
represents roughly an eleven percent increase.  In addition, I find that 55-to-61-year-olds 
decrease their hours worked per week by a statistically significant 1.25 hours.  Among 
the low-educated, 65-to-69-year-olds increase labor supply by 1.54 hours a week, and 55-
to-61-year-olds decrease hours by 0.99 hours per week, and both coefficients are 
statistically significant.  Among the high-educated, only the coefficient for the young 
group is statistically significant, and it suggests that 55-to-61-year-olds decrease labor 
supply by 1.71 hours a week. 
Table 2.10.5. presents results using equation (1) using hours worked last week as 
a measure of labor supply with Sample 1B again, but now the target group has been 
broken up into individual age groups.  I again estimate linear models using the full 
sample and subsamples.  In the full sample, I find that the increase in hours in the target 
group is mainly driven by 65-year-olds who increase labor supply by a statistically 
significant 2.38 hours a week.  For 65-year-olds, the average number of hours worked a 
week prior to the repeal is 11.19, so this increase translates to about a 21 percent increase.  
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None of the other coefficients are statistically significant.  When I estimate the model 
using the subsamples, I find that, among the low-educated, 65-, 67-, and 68-year-olds 
increase the number of hours by 2.64, 1.83, and 2.31, respectively, and the coefficients 
are all statistically significant. 
Tables 2.11.1.-2.11.5. present results with equation (1) using employment, entry, 
exit, and continuation as my measures of labor supply with Sample 2.  I present the 
results for the control covariates first and find that again, employment is increasing in 
education and decreasing in age.  Entry is decreasing in age, but there is not systematic 
pattern between entry and education.  Exit peaks at age 62 and is high at ages 64 and 65, 
but then decreases, not surprising considering that the exit rate cannot be high if 
employment is low.  Continuation is decreasing in age but increasing in education.  I use 
entry, exit, and continuation to examine whether the change in employment came about 
because more or fewer workers enter, exit, or continue in the labor force than before.  In 
those tables, I again estimate probit models.  I re-run equation (1) with employment as 
my measure of labor supply with this new sample to ensure that the results from Sample 
2 do not differ too much from Sample 1B because of attrition and a slightly different age 
composition.  Using employment as the labor supply measure, I find that I get the 
expected signs for the young and the target group, negative and positive, respectively.  
The coefficient on the target group is statistically significant and the magnitude of the 
coefficients is similar to that of the results from Sample 1B in Table 2.8.4.  When I use 
entry, exit, and continuation as my measures of labor supply, respectively, I find that the 
repeal affects the continuation rate of the target group, as the likelihood of 65-to-69-year-
olds’ continuing in the labor force has increased by a statistically significant 2.43 
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percentage points in response to the repeal.  Neither entry nor exit of 65-to-69-year-olds 
is statistically significantly affected by the repeal. Table 2.11.5. presents results with 
equation (1) using employment, entry, exit, and continuation as my measures of labor 
supply with Sample 2 with the target group broken up into individual age groups.  In 
those tables, I again estimate probit models.  I find that the continuation rate of 65-year-
olds has increased by a statistically significant 4.78 percentage points.  I get similar 
results using a linear probability model, shown in Tables 2.12.1.-2.12.5. 
I return to the issue of whether the low-educated are differentially affected from 
the high-educated, using Wald tests, reported in Table 2.13.  I find that the coefficients 
for the low-educated are statistically significantly different from the high-educated.  The 
tests do indicate that jointly the model for the low-educated is different from that for the 
high-educated.  However, allowing all control covariates to differ between the low- and 
the high-educated, I find that the coefficients of interest are not statistically significantly 
different in the low-educated sample from the high-educated sample. 
 
A. Robustness Tests 
I run several robustness tests.  First, I use April 2000 as the date of law change, 
when the law was passed and announced to the public instead of January 2000, the date 
for which the law was effective.  The results do not change much.  All coefficients of 
significance still point in the same direction.  The only changes are that the coefficient on 
the target group in Sample 1B is now only marginally significant in the estimation on 
employment rate in the probit model.  Also, the coefficient on age 68 when I break up the 
target group by individual age is now no longer marginally significant.  Finally, in the 
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low-educated sample, the coefficient on age 65 is now only marginally significant.  In the 
hours equation, all coefficients stay virtually the same.  In the conditional equation using 
Sample 2, the coefficient on the young is now statistically significant and the coefficient 
on the target group is now just marginally significant in the employment equation.  
Further, the effect on exit among the young is no longer marginally significant.  Also, the 
coefficient on age 66 for the continuation and employment estimations is now marginally 
significant.  Finally, the coefficient on age 68 is now no longer marginally significant 
(see Tables 2.14.1.1.-2.14.5.2.). 
When I add disabled persons back to the sample, again, results do not change 
much.  Now, in the employment equation for the modified Sample 1B I get a statistically 
significant coefficient for the young in the linear and probit models instead of a 
marginally significant one.  Furthermore, the coefficient on the target group is only 
marginally significant in the probit model for the low-educated.  Additionally, the 
coefficient on age 68 is no longer marginally significant in the overall sample in the 
linear model overall, and now only marginally significant in both linear and probit model 
among the low-educated.  Finally, among the low-educated, the coefficient on 67-year-
olds is now no longer marginally significant in the probit model.  For the hours equation, 
I find that among the low-educated, the coefficients on ages 67 and 68 are no longer 
statistically significant.  In the conditional equation, the coefficient on exit among the 
young is no longer marginally significant.  In addition, the coefficient on the target group 
in the probit estimation is now only marginally significant.  Finally, the effects I find for 
the young in the employment equation are now statistically and marginally significant, 
respectively, in the linear and probit model, respectively (see Tables 2.15.1.1.-2.15.5.2.).  
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Overall, all significant (or marginally significant) coefficients retain the same sign, only 
the level of significance changes, if that. 
 
B. Auxiliary Results 
 If the repeal was the impetus for the increase in labor supply among the target 
group, I would expect the number of full-time workers to increase in the target group.  If 
the increase in labor supply were concentrated among the part-time workers, one would 
think that the repeal had little to do with the increase, because part-time work was an 
option even before the repeal, as long as one stayed beneath the exempt amount.  As 
shown in Figures 3.4. and 3.5., however, full-time work increased among the target 
group, while part-time work stayed roughly constant.  Conversely, full-time work stayed 
relatively constant among the young and intermediate groups.  The comparison group, the 
70+-year-olds, experienced a slight increase in full-time work as well. 
The repeal of the RET could have two effects.  It could increase labor supply 
among those who were going to claim benefits by the normal retirement age regardless of 
any changes to the law.  It could also entice individuals who were going to work from 
ages 65-69 to claim earlier.  However, because the DRC is undergoing a number of 
increases before and after the repeal of the RET, the increase in labor supply that I found 
in the regression analysis could have happened for two different reasons.  Those older 
men might be working now while also claiming benefits instead of simply claiming 
benefits and not working.  Or those men could be working now and they are delaying 
claiming benefits because of more generous DRC’s.  Using 1997-2002 March CPS data, I 
also estimate simple correlations between earnings and Social Security income among 
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65-to-69-year-olds.  I find that the correlation coefficient increases from -0.2477 to -
0.0095, the negative correlation virtually disappearing.  It not surprising that the 
coefficient was large and negative before the repeal.  Because of the earnings test, there 
was a mechanical relationship prior to the repeal.  However, what is of interest is that the 
coefficient becomes virtually zero after the repeal.  Furthermore, I find that, before the 
repeal, among 4,347 white men aged 65-69, 3,741 (86.1%) received Social Security 
Benefits.  Out of the 1,494 who worked that year, 1,148 (76.8%) received benefits.  After 
the repeal, 1,682 out of 1,873 white men (89.8%) received benefits.  Noteworthy is that 
out of the 678 that worked, now 582 (85.8%) received benefits.   
 
IX. Discussion 
Using data from the Outgoing Rotation Groups of the CPS, I find evidence that 
the repeal of the RET spurred labor supply among 65-to-69-year-olds as measured by 
employment, especially among the low-educated.  The coefficients are statistically 
significant in both probit and linear probability models.  In addition, I also find that 65-
to-69-year-olds increase labor supply as measured by hours worked last week. 
Further, I find that younger workers, those between 55 and 61 years of age, 
reduce their labor supply in response to the repeal.  This finding is not surprising when 
one examines the issue from a life-cycle perspective—younger workers are substituting 
work at a later age for work now because a penalty for work at a later age has been lifted.  
They are reacting to a reduction in their relative wage by lowering labor supply. 
I further find that the increase in labor supply is largely driven by continuers, not 
re-enterers.  The rate of 65-to-69-year-olds who were at work a year ago and still are at 
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work has increased by about two percentage points, while the rate of 65-to-69-year-olds 
who entered the work force over the past year has remained unchanged.  People who 
were 67 at the time of the repeal are often already out of the labor force and do not re-
enter.  On the other hand, people who were 65 at the time of repeal are often still in the 
labor force, and their continuing to stay in the labor force drives the increase in the 
employment rate of the target group.  Therefore, I expect the long-term effect of the 
repeal to be greater as those 65-year-olds who continue to stay in the labor force age.  
This result leads me to believe that the coefficient for the target group found here is 
actually a lower bound on the long-run impact of the repeal of the RET on labor supply.   
The results I get when I break up the target group into individual ages suggest that 
the long-term effect will be greater.  I find that continuation increases dramatically 
among 65-year-olds.  Therefore, I would expect the effect of the repeal on the labor 
supply of older workers to increase over time as more workers opt to continue to stay in 
the labor force until a later age than now as workers re-optimize their labor supply 
behavior over their lifetime. 
There is also some weaker evidence that the low-educated react more strongly 
than the high-educated.  This finding suggests that those who are taxed the most by the 
RET, the low-educated who die youngest, are impacted the most by the repeal.  
Coefficients on regressions with the low-educated group tend to be greater in magnitude 
than those on regressions with the high-educated group.  Moreover, coefficients among 
the low-educated group also tend to be significant more often.  These results seem to 
support the theory that the RET taxes low-educated workers the most, so they should 
change their labor supply behavior most strongly after it was repealed.  Wald-tests 
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confirm that the models are statistically significantly different for the low-educated from 
the high-educated.   
I further find that the increase in labor supply by 65-to-69-year-olds is driven by 
an increase in full-time workers, while the share of part-time workers stays roughly 
constant in that age group.  This result suggests that the increase in labor supply was 
driven primarily by full-time workers and that the repeal of the RET is the impetus for the 
increase in labor supply.  The RET was not discouraging part-time work as much as full-
time work, as workers could still work part time with no penalty as long as they earned 
less than the exempt amount.  Furthermore, when looking at simple means and 
correlations between labor supply and Social Security benefits receipt, I find that, after 
the repeal, more 65-to-69-year-old men receive benefits while working.  This result 
suggests that the increase in labor supply was primarily driven by men who were going to 
claim benefits by the normal retirement age regardless of any changes to the law, rather 
than by men who are working longer because of the increase in the DRC. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
WHY IS HUSBAND’S LABOR SUPPLY STRONGLY CORRELATED WITH 
WIFE’S LABOR SUPPLY?  THE CASE OF OLDER COUPLES 
 
I. Introduction 
 Presently, there are many proposals to extend the solvency of the Social Security 
program.  For the most part, research on the effect of Social Security on labor supply has 
focused on the retirement behavior of men.  But there is increasing recognition that to 
fully understand the implications of policy changes one needs to consider the retirement 
behavior of men and women jointly.  In fact, because of support from survivor’s benefits 
and the greater longevity of women, the majority (60 percent) of adults receiving Social 
Security benefits in old age are women.  And given the historical rise in the labor force 
participation rate of women over the last 40 years, policy effects on women’s retirement 
choices will have increasing importance. 
 This paper focuses on the joint labor supply decisions of husbands and wives.  
There are large literatures on male labor supply and retirement, and there is a moderately-
sized literature on family labor supply for prime-age couples.  By comparison, very few 
studies examine the family labor supply of older couples.  This is perhaps surprising in 
light of evidence that retirement frequently occurs for both spouses within one calendar 
quarter (see Blau (1988)).   
 As Hurd (1990) points out, there are three reasons why exit from the labor force 
may be positively linked among spouses.  First, in equilibrium, assortative mating may 
lead spouses to behave similarly for unobservable reasons. For example, spouses may 
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have common preferences for leisure, and the inherent unobservability of these 
preferences is one reason why simple tabulations may not identify causal relationships.  
But assortative mating can lead to correlation in wages, too.  For example, suppose 
spousal education is positively correlated and more educated men and women work for 
more of their lives.  Then, even if each partner’s labor supply decision is made 
independently of the other’s, cross-sectional analyses will show a positive correlation 
between spouses’ labor supply.  To the degree that factors associated with both marriage 
and labor supply can be observed, one can control for them directly.  However, offered 
wages for retired people must be estimated, again raising the possibility of bias due to 
unobserved heterogeneity.  
 Many unobservable factors likely affect both marriage and work.  While 
assortative mating provides one example of problematic unobserved heterogeneity, it is 
not difficult to think of other sources of bias.  Married couples share their lives in many 
ways, and it is likely that joint unobserved factors affecting husbands’ labor supply affect 
wives’ labor supply as well.  For example, because husbands and wives live together, 
unobserved local economic conditions will simultaneously affect labor supply and 
retirement decisions of both spouses. 
 A promising approach in investigating the extent of leisure complementarities 
involves finding changes in retirement incentives that face one spouse but plausibly do 
not affect the other.  This variation is then used to construct instrumental variables for the 
retirement status of the directly affected spouse. 
Baker (1999) provides a good example of this approach in studying a policy 
change in the Canadian Income Security system.  The Spouse’s Allowance extended 
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retirement benefits to a spouse aged 60 to 65 (the previous minimum was 65) provided 
they have a spouse aged 65 or older.  Hence there is variation in eligibility because of 
differences in spouses’ ages.  As long as these age differences can be treated as 
exogenous, spousal coverage by the program becomes exogenous, conditional on own 
age.  Since this program largely targeted women, it provides an opportunity to examine 
husbands’ response to wives’ incentives.   
 In this paper, I examine the joint labor supply of husbands and wives in a family 
context with separability of utility from consumption and leisure.  My approach accounts 
for the joint labor supply decisions of married couples.  I explicitly investigate the role of 
liquidity constraints as well as the effects of wage variation on labor force participation.  I 
do allow separate effects of own age on each spouse’s labor supply decision.  I model 
both exogenous changes in liquidity at a known age and exogenous changes in wages due 
to variation across states in age discrimination laws. 
 I introduce two empirical tests of the underlying model using two sources of 
variation.  My first source of variation in economic variables concerns liquidity 
constraints.  It is well-known that there is a spike in retirement at age 62. One explanation 
for this spike is the fact that Social Security benefits cannot be claimed until age 62.  As 
Rust and Phelan (1997) and others have argued, this restriction means that before a 
spouse turns 62, some families will be liquidity constrained with respect to benefits 
available to that spouse.  Hence for liquidity constrained couples, a spouse’s turning 62 
acts like a scheduled “helicopter drop” of money.  This increase in accessible wealth will 
lead the family to increase consumption over the balance of the lifecycle and will reduce 
the marginal utility of wealth.  As noted above, it will also lead to reductions in optimal 
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labor supply for both spouses, much like increases in nonlabor income do in a static 
model.  The key point to note is that each spouse’s turning 62 has an effect on wealth for 
liquidity constrained households.  I can thus investigate the effects of liquidity constraints 
associated with each spouse on the other’s behavior.  
 This argument suggests the benefit of a very simple strategy for establishing the 
role of liquidity constraints on spousal labor supply—investigating the correlation 
between own labor supply and spouse’s age.  My key assumption (as in Baker (1999)) is 
that age differences between husbands and wives are otherwise exogenous to the labor 
supply decision once I have controlled for own age.  Once this assumption is made, the 
presence of liquidity constraints suggests that not only should labor supply of one’s 
spouse labor supply be discontinuous at ages 62 and 65, but when a spouse turns 62 and 
65, one’s own labor supply should be affected as well.  Despite its simplicity, to my 
knowledge this approach has not been investigated to date. 
 I test the null hypothesis that there are discrete changes in neither preferences nor 
wages at age 62.  Even after controlling for a quartic in each spouse’s age, this hypothesis 
is strongly and consistently rejected in my data, which come from the U.S. Censuses for 
1970-1980.  The results imply that either there is a discrete increase in preferences for 
own leisure at age 62, or effective (perceived) wages rise at that age.  
 The second source of variation focuses on anticipated changes in wages.  In 
MaCurdy’s (1981) terminology, this amounts to investigating changes in labor supply 
arising from movement along a spouse’s lifetime wage profile.  The effect of such 
changes in the price of a husband’s time on his wife’s consumption of leisure (and vice-
versa) is a test of direct complementarity of spousal leisure.  I argue that state-level 
 48
variation in age discrimination laws effectively shift a covered person’s wage.  Neumark 
and Stock (1999) show that protection from age discrimination increases the fraction of 
older men in the labor force while steepening age-earnings profiles.  If differences across 
states in spousal age differences are exogenous to labor supply decisions, then I can 
exploit the fact that own protection from age discrimination is not perfectly collinear with 
spousal protection and use the same variation while controlling for both age and state 
effects.  In light of Neumark and Stock’s (1999) results, I interpret these laws as 
effectively increasing wages when workers are older.  Controlling for own coverage by 
the laws, I can thus use spousal coverage as a source of variation to identify cross-price 
effects, and hence the sign of any complementarities in spousal leisure. 
In section II, I briefly review some relevant papers.  In section III, I discuss age 
discrimination laws in place between 1970 and 1980 and discuss the effects of these laws 
on wages.  The details of the laws will be important in the specification of the 
econometric model.  In section IV, I describe my data.  In section V, I present the 
econometric model.  In section VI, I report my main empirical results.  I find that labor 
force participation of both spouses changes significantly when either turns 62, even after 
controlling for demographic variables.  Unless this finding is to be attributed to discrete 
changes in either preferences or wages occurring at exactly age 62, this evidence suggests 
that the labor supply choice of each spouse is significantly related to liquidity effects 
deriving from either spouse’s age.  I also show that protection from age discrimination 
raises own labor force participation for both spouses in 1970, but only for husbands in 
1980, extending Neumark and Stock’s (1999) results to women as well as men.  
However, I find no evidence that spousal coverage either raises or lowers own labor force 
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participation.  This finding suggests that husbands’ leisure and wives’ leisure are not 
complements .  Finally, in section 7, I offer some conclusions. 
 
II. Brief Review of the Literature 
Hurd (1990) was one of the first to document the link in the retirement behavior 
between husbands and wives.  Using the New Beneficiary Survey (NBS), he finds that 
the retirements of spouses occur as a joint process, as spouses often retire within a short 
time of each other.  Further, he finds that age differences explain large differences in 
retirement age.  However, he offers no explanation as to why joint retirement takes place, 
merely that it could be due to unobservables, assortative mating, or complementarities in 
leisure, leaving the question open for future research. 
Blau (1998) confirms this link using the RHS.  He finds that the probability of 
exiting the labor force in a given quarter is greater for the individual if the spouse is out 
of the labor force.  His identification strategy exploits the fact that husbands and wives 
can be in one of four different labor force states—both can work, husband works, wife 
does not, or both do not work.  For example, a wife whose husband is already out of the 
labor force exits the labor force the following calendar quarter with probability 3.53 
percent.  On the other hand, the probability of her exiting the labor force if her husband 
still is in the labor force is a mere 2.40 percent.  For the husband the story is similar:  with 
the wife already out of the labor force, the probability of his exiting is 2.61 percent.  If 
she still is in the labor force, the probability of exiting is 1.98 percent.  Conversely, if the 
spouse is already out of the labor force, the individual is also less likely to enter the labor 
force.  In addition, if the spouse is out of the labor force, the individual is also less likely 
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to enter the labor force.  For the wife, if the husband is out of the labor force, her 
likelihood of entering the labor force in the following quarter is 0.52 percent.  If the 
husband is employed, that probability increases to 1.11 percent.  The results for the 
husband are similar.  If the wife is out of the labor force, the probability of the husband’s 
entering is 1.44 percent.  If the wife is in the labor force, the probability of the husband’s 
entry jumps to 2.24 percent.  Regression analysis confirms this finding that he obtained 
from simply examining the descriptive statistics.  His study provides compelling evidence 
for a link between spouses’ labor supplies. 
 Baker (2002) examines the impact of the introduction of the Spouse’s Allowance 
(SPA) in Canada on the labor supply behavior of couples.  The SPA made it possible for 
individuals to receive Canadian Income Security (IS) benefits as early as age 60, 
provided their spouse was at least 65 years of age.  This implicitly made joint retirement 
less costly for spouses, as the younger spouse was immediately eligible for IS benefits.  
Exploiting age differences as the identification strategy, he found an increase in the rate 
of being out of the labor force among males aged 65 to 75 with SPA-eligible spouses, 
while the control groups (males aged 65 to 75 with spouses aged 65 to 75, males aged 65 
to 75 with spouses aged 55 to 59, and single males aged 65 to 75) did not.  Women 
eligible for SPA (females aged 60 to 64 with spouses aged 65 to 75), on the other hand, 
did not share in the increase in labor force participation those in the comparison cohorts, 
which comprised of women aged 60 to 64 with spouses either aged 50 to 59 or aged 60 to 
64.  Thus, there seems to be a joint response to the change in policy, which directly 
affected the wives only, suggesting some joint retirement behavior. 
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 My approach builds on Baker (2002), using age differences between husbands 
and wives to identify the effect of each turning 62 and 65, respectively.  Because the SPA 
induced wives to reduce labor supply, it is not possible to determine whether husbands 
reduced labor supply because of income pooling or complementarities in leisure.  
However, using variation in age discrimination laws across states and the variation in age 
differences, where coverage by those age discrimination laws induces increased labor 
supply, I can examine whether the joint response arises from complementarities in leisure 
or not, a question previously unanswered in the literature. 
 
III. Age Discrimination Laws Across States 
 Protection from age discrimination laws restricts firms’ ability to dismiss, deny 
employment to, or reduce wages of workers on the basis of age.  The ages for which 
protection is effective varies from state to state, but many states have maximum ages 
above which workers are no longer protected from age-related job actions. 
 Three states passed laws against age discrimination before 1940:  Colorado, 
Louisiana, and Massachusetts.  Six more states followed before 1960:  Connecticut, New 
York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin.  Between 1960 and 1980, 29 
more states, including the District of Columbia, followed suit.  In addition, many of the 
states which already had anti-age discrimination laws expanded coverage of their laws.  
From 1980 on, nine more states enacted their first state laws against age discrimination, 
in addition to the expansion of those laws in other states.  Today, only four states have 
never passed a state law against age discrimination: Alabama, Arkansas, Mississippi, and 
South Dakota.  Note that not only does the existence of such laws vary by state, but so 
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does enforcement of those laws.  Therefore, state fixed effects in the econometric 
analysis will account not only for varying local economic conditions and other 
unobservables but also for the varying enforcement in each state.  Coverage by those 
laws varies by state, but not by occupation within a state. 
 In 1968, Congress enacted the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) 
to “promote employment of older persons based on their ability rather than age; to 
prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment; to help employers and workers find 
ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of age on employment.”  In 1979, the 
ADEA was strengthened when enforcement authority was transferred to the Equal 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC).  At the time, a number of states also had state laws 
banning age discrimination or mandatory retirement, with the laws generally covering 
people whose age falls in a specific range. 
Aging out of age discrimination protection is essentially a reduction in wages, 
even when employment is the relevant margin. When a worker is dismissed because he or 
she is too old, the worker’s opportunity set of jobs has shrunk.  Under the assumption that 
workers can always find a job at some lower wage, dismissal is effectively a wage 
reduction for workers with job-specific human capital.  These assertions suggest that 
adjusting for age, workers covered by age discrimination laws should have higher wages 
than unprotected workers and should also be in the labor force more often; this is exactly 
what Neumark and Stock (1999) find.   
If workers have perfect foresight concerning their likelihood of experiencing age 
discrimination, then the implied wage change is an evolutionary one and will not affect 
the marginal utility of wealth.  By contrast, if there is some uncertainty over whether a 
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worker will be subject to age discrimination, then the wage change is discontinuous, and 
the marginal utility of wealth will have to adjust. 
The cross-sectional differences I want to exploit in my analysis are those that 
arise from different age differences between the wife and the husband and geographic 
differences between couples, which determine whether there are any age discrimination 
laws in a state. 
 
IV. Data 
 In my empirical work, I use the 1970 and 1980 Public Use Micro Samples from 
the Decennial Census long form surveys.  In 1970, the census implemented two surveys, 
one conducted on 15 percent of households and the other on 5 percent of households.  
From each of these surveys, I use two independent samples representing 1 percent of the 
population, so that the combined files are a 4 percent sample of the U.S. population in 
1970.  The 1980 public use data files provide data on 5 percent of the U.S. population.  I 
limit my sample to men and women who married far in advance of retirement age.  
Except when the underlying variables are unavailable, all couples in my sample satisfied 
the following selection criteria: 
1. The husband was no older than 35 when the couple was married. 
2. The marriage is the first one for the husband.  
3. The husband is 55 to 74 years old. 
4. The wife’s age is within 15 years of the husband’s. 
5. The husband and wife both worked within a ten year time period prior to the 
Census year.   
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6. Neither the husband nor the wife were on active military duty in the week the 
household was surveyed. 
7. Neither the husband nor the wife has a work-limiting disability. 
8. No data used in the analysis or sample selection is allocated by the Census 
Bureau. 
Table 3.1. presents summary statistics for the 1970 Census sample.  In 1970, 
husbands’ average age is 61.06 years, about 4 years older than their wives.  On average, 
couples in my sample got married when the husband was 25.69 years old.  This implies 
that the couples in my 1970 sample have been married an average of 35.37 years.  63.65 
percent of couples live together with no other individual in their household.  In 1970, 
57.93 percent of husbands 55-74 and 47.31 percent of their wives had not received a high 
school diploma.  In 1980, husbands’ average age is 60.95 years, about 3 years older than 
their wives.  On average, couples in 1980 married when the husband was 25.12 years old.  
This implies that the couples in my 1980 sample have been married an average of 35.84 
years.  61.44 percent of couples live together with no other individual in their household.  
Of those that live with other people, 5.14 percent lived with a person 6 years of age or 
younger, 35.10 percent lived with a person aged 18 or younger, and 10.36 percent live 
with a person 70 years of age or older.   
 Individuals are recorded as “Out of the Labor Force (OLF)” if this was their labor 
force status in the week before responding to the Census.  People are recorded as “In the 
Labor Force” if they were at work, not at work but with a job or were unemployed in the 
Census week.  According to Table 3.1., 20.31 percent of men and 34.44 percent of 
women in my sample were not in the labor force in the Census week in 1970.  
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 Table 3.2. presents a cross-tabulation of labor force participation rates for both 
spouses in 1970.  This table highlights the central correlation on which I focus:  
correlation between the husband’s choice and his wife’s choice to participate in the labor 
force.  Table 3.2. makes clear the strong correlation in spouses’ choices:  in 1970, 70.2 
percent of the wives of working husbands worked, while only 44.7 percent of the wives 
of non-working husbands worked.  Therefore, when a husband is not in the labor force, 
the likelihood that his wife is also out of the labor force is 25 percentage points higher 
than when the husband is working. 
 In 1970, I start out with 527,165 men aged 55 to 74.  Out of those, 448,634 were 
married.  When I impose the qualifier that spouses’ ages be within 15 years of each 
others’, the sample shrinks to 429,400.  Out of those, 410,123 were married by the age of 
35.  Of those, 373,989 were still in their first marriage.  Of those, there were 354,638 
couples were neither spouse had a disability that prevented them from working.  Among 
them, 171,111 were couples where both spouses had worked sometime in the past ten 
years.  Finally, 123,728 had no relevant variables allocated for either husband or wife.  
All 123,728 of those couples had no missing variables for the employment variable, but 
only 123,581 had no missing variables among the relevant ones. 
 In 1980, I start out with 792,855 men aged 55 to 74.  Of those, 679,616 were 
married, and 656,350 were within 15 years of their wife’s age.  611,924 were married by 
the age of 35, and 505,871 of those were married just once.  388,395 of those are couples 
were neither is disabled so as to prevent any work.  228,613 of those were couples where 
both spouses worked at some time during the past ten years.  132,414 of them had no 
relevant variables allocated, and 132,310 had no missing values for labor force status. 
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V. Econometric Model 
I address the question of whether, after controlling for own age and other 
characteristics, spouse’s age still affects one’s own labor supply.  I estimate a reduced 
form probit, with a dummy for labor force participation as the dependent variable.  The 
dummy equals 1 if the person is out of the labor force, and 0 if the respondent was at 
work with a job, not at work with a job, or looking for a job.   
The baseline model is a univariate probit model with the following equations: 
l*iht = θih0 + Di62ht θh 62h + Di62wt θh 62w + (Di62ht * Di62wt) θh,both62 + Di65ht θh 65h  (2) 
+ Di65wt θh 65w + (Di65ht * Di65wt) θh,both65 + Xiht θhh + Xiwt θhw + εiht  
l*iwt = θiw0 + Di62ht θw 62h + Di62wt θw 62w + (Di62ht * Di62wt) θw,both62 + Di65ht θw 65h  (3) 
+ Di65wt θw 65w + (Di65ht * Di65wt) θw,both65 + Xiht θwh + Xiwt θww + εiwt  
where l*iht and l*iwt are desired leisure (latent) of the husband and the wife, respectively, 
i.e., dummy variables for whether husband and wife, respectively, are out of the labor 
force.  Di62ht is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the husband is at least 62 years old, 
Di62wt is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the wife is at least 62 years old, Di65ht is a 
dummy variable that equals 1 if the husband is at least 65 years old, and Di65wt is a 
dummy variable that equals 1 if the wife is at least 65 years old.  The coefficients on the 
dummy variables are the coefficients of interest.  The dummy variables for being at least 
62 and 65 account for the well known discontinuous drops in labor force participation 
when one turns 62 and 65.  The more interesting variables are the dummy variables for 
the spouse if he or she is at least 62 and 65 years old, and the interaction terms for both 
spouses being at least 62 and 65 years of age.  In a family labor supply context with 
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income pooling and liquidity constraints, either spouse’s turning 62 results in an increase 
in family wealth and should thus affect labor supply of both spouses.  I also include 
interaction terms because, for example, the wife might be drawing spouse’s benefits16, so 
there might be an additional wealth effect for both being at least 62.  At age 65, the 
earliest age for Medicare eligibility and often the earliest age for pension receipt, there 
might again be wealth effects at work.  In addition to the wealth effects, one might 
imagine that there are complementarities in leisure, so if turning 62 or 65 induces one 
spouse to retire (because of mandatory retirement or other reasons), the other one might 
retire with the spouse, not because of wealth effects, but because they might enjoy 
spending time together.  Xiht is a vector control for the demographics of the husband, 
which includes a dummy variable for whether the husband is white, a vector of dummy 
variables for educational attainment for the husband, a quartic in the demeaned age 
variable, and a dummy variable for whether the observation is drawn from the 15 percent 
sample for 1970, Xiwt is a vector control for the demographics of the wife, analogous to 
the one for the husband plus whether she has had any children, and if yes, how many, and 
εiht and εiwt are the error terms for the equations for the husband and the wife, respectively.  
I also run an alternative model where I include state fixed effects to account for local 
labor market conditions and other unobservables.  The one problem with the model is that 
one might suggest that θih0 and θiw0 are actually endogenous and depend on the marginal 
utility of wealth, which in turn depends on the income over the couple’s lifetime.  If there 
are cohort-specific changes in wages or Social Security policy, the marginal utility of 
wealth will be correlated with the age-62 (and age-65) dummy variables.  Because of the 
                                                          
16 Spouse’s benefits are benefits one receives on account of a spouse’s Social 
Security earnings history, up to 50% of what the working spouse receives. 
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focus on the liquidity effects at age 62 (and age 65), I believe the problem is not too 
severe in a reduced form model.  However, to better capture unobservables that might 
affect the marginal utility of wealth, I run a bivariate probit model as well that will help 
control for unobservables that jointly affect both spouses, i.e., local labor market 
conditions and wealth. 
The second part of the analysis uses coverage by age discrimination laws as an 
instrument for wages.  I use an instrumental-variables approach to determine whether the 
apparent joint retirement comes about because of complementarities in leisure.  Coverage 
by age discrimination laws should serve well as an instrument because in itself coverage 
does not affect the labor supply decision itself.  However, as Neumark and Stock (1999) 
have shown, coverage does affect the offer wage, and via that channel, labor supply.  
Furthermore, while coverage by age discrimination laws effectively increases one’s own 
wage in old age, it should have no effect on the spouse’s wage.  If I find that own 
coverage increases labor supply while spouse’s coverage does not, this result would point 
toward the absence of complementarities in leisure.  Specifically, I use the following 
equations for my bivariate probit analysis: 
l*iht = θih0 + Di62ht θh 62h + Di62wt θh 62w + (Di62ht * Di62wt) θh,both62 + Di65ht θh 65h  (4) 
+ Di65wt θh 65w + (Di65ht * Di65wt) θh,both65 + Dihpadt θh hpad + Diwpadt θh wpad  
+ Xiht θhh + Xiwt θhw + εiht  
l*iwt = θiw0 + Di62ht θw 62h + Di62wt θw 62w + (Di62ht * Di62wt) θw,both62 + Di65ht θw 65h  (5) 
+ Di65wt θw 65w + (Di65ht * Di65wt) θw,both65 + Dihpadt θw hpad + Diwpadt θw wpad  
+ Xiht θwh + Xiwt θww + εiwt  
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where Dihpadt is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the husband is covered by age 
discrimination laws, Diwpadt is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the wife is covered by 
age discrimination laws, and the remaining variables are as defined for equations (2) and 
(3).  I would expect that own coverage by age discrimination laws increases one’s 
employment rate (or decreases the rate at which one is out of the labor force), as 
Neumark and Stock (1999) find.  I have no priors for spousal coverage by age 
discrimination laws.  Should I find that spousal coverage increases the rate at which one 
is out of the labor force, this result would point toward substitution in leisure, while a 
decrease in the rate at which one is out of the labor force would point toward 
complementarities in leisure.  I again run an alternative model where I include state fixed 
effects.  Recall that with age discrimination laws, state fixed effects account not only for 
local labor market conditions and other unobservables as before, but also for the 
difference in enforcement of those laws across states.  In the first-stage regression on 
wages of husbands and wives, respectively, I find F-values of 7.30 and 22.78, suggesting 
that coverage by age discrimination laws is highly correlated with wages.  Therefore, the 
identifying variation in my model comes from the variation in age differences between 
husbands and wives and the variation in laws that applies to the couples based on the 
state they live in.  
 
VI. Results 
 I report results from using a bivariate probit model with state fixed effects in 
Tables 3.4.1 and 3.4.2.  Here and subsequently, results reported are the means of the 
marginal effects.  I find that the husband’s being white increases the probability of being 
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out of the labor force for both husband and wife.  While hard to interpret, my highly 
stratified sample is more than 90 percent white, so the result might not be meaningful.  
Further, I find that own education decreases the likelihood of being out of the labor force 
for both husbands and wives, as expected.  On the other hand, spouse’s education 
increases the probability of being out of the labor force for both husbands and wives.  
Having no children increases the probability of being out of the labor force for both, but 
conditional on having children, having more children increases the likelihood of being 
out of the labor force compared to fewer for both.  Own age increases the probability of 
being out of the labor force for both.  On the other hand, spouse’s age has no effect on the 
wife, and a small but statistically significant effect on the husband, increasing his 
probability of being out of the labor force. 
 Among the parameters of interest in Table 3.4.2., all coefficients are of the 
expected sign.  In the husband’s equation, his being at least 62 increases his probability 
by a statistically significant 3.23 percentage points.  In addition, his being at least 65 
increases the probability by a statistically significant 10.38 percentage points, and his 
wife’s being at least 65 increases it by a marginally significant 1.49 percentage points, 
while the interaction term for age 65 implies a statistically significant decrease by 1.78 
percentage points if both are 65 or older.   
For the wife, both her being at least 62 increases her probability by a statistically 
significant 4.75 percentage points, while her and her husband’s being at least 62 increases 
the probability by a statistically significant 1.87 percentage points.  Moreover, her being 
at least 65 increases the probability by a statistically significant 6.69 percentage points, 
and her husband’s being at least 65 increases it by a marginally significant 1.37 
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percentage points.  The results are quite similar without state fixed effects and using a 
univariate probit, while most of the coefficients are similar using a linear probability 
model (see Tables 3.4.1. and 3.4.2. for results without state fixed effects and Tables 3.5.1. 
and 3.5.2. for the results using a univariate probit model). 
 For 1980, I present the results in Tables 3.6.1. and 3.6.2.  For the control 
covariates, there are only a few major differences compared to 1970.  Wives’ being white 
decreases the probability of husbands’ being out of the labor force.  Also, the wife’s 
education has no effect on husband’s labor force status now.  Furthermore, conditional on 
having children, the number of children does not affect the wife’s labor force status, 
while it reduces the probability of the husband being out of the labor force.   
As for the parameters of interest, those results are also quite similar to those from 
1970, with all own age effects again of the expected sign and statistically significant, as 
presented in Table 3.6.2.  I find that the husband’s being at least 62 increases his 
probability by a statistically significant 7.08 percentage points, and his wife’s being at 
least 62 increases the probability by a statistically significant 2.03 percentage points.  In 
addition, his being at least 65 increases his probability by a statistically significant 6.39 
percentage points.  For the wife, her being at least 62 increases her probability by a 
statistically significant 6.43 percentage points, and their both being at least 62 increases 
her probability by a statistically significant 3.12 percentage points.  Further, her being at 
least 65 increases her probability by a statistically significant 2.88 percentage points, and 
their both being at least 65 increases her probability by a statistically significant 5.25 
percentage points.  Results without state fixed effects, presented in Tables 3.6.1. and 
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3.6.2., and using a univariate probit model, presented in Tables 3.7.1. and 3.7.2., are quite 
similar.  
I now focus my attention on the role of protection from age discrimination.  
Because age discrimination laws were being implemented in the years surrounding 1970, 
there is a good degree of variation in the laws across states for the 1970 data.  The 1970 
estimates of own- and cross-effects related to age discrimination laws seem to confirm 
the absence of complementarities in leisure.  Again I find strong evidence that coverage 
by age discrimination laws lowers the rate at which both husbands and wives are out of 
the labor force in 1970.  Tables 3.8.1 and 3.8.2. present results for 1970 with protection 
from age discrimination as an instrument for wages.  The control covariates are very 
similar to those from the estimation without age discrimination.  Most of the coefficients 
for the age-dummy variables are similar as well, with one exception:  both being at least 
65 years of age now increases the wife’s probability of being out of the labor force by a 
marginally significant 2.00 percentage points.  As for the parameters of interest in this 
estimation, own coverage by age discrimination laws and spousal coverage by age 
discrimination laws, the only statistically significant coefficients are that the husband’s 
probability of being out of the labor force decreases by 1.94 percentage points if he is 
covered, while the wife’s probability decreases by 2.48 percentage points if she is 
covered.  I find no evidence that spousal coverage affects labor force status of either 
husband or wife.  Removing state fixed effects, the effect of the wife’s coverage on her 
own labor force status disappears, but there are no cross effects, as shown in Tables 3.8.1. 
and 3.8.2. 
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In 1980, results for the control covariates are similar to the estimation without age 
discrimination laws.  Tables 3.9.1 and 3.9.2. presents the results for equations (4) and (5) 
for 1980.  The coefficients of interest are statistically significant only in the husband’s 
equation.  In the bivariate probit model with state fixed effects, his probability of being 
out of the labor force decreases by 1.50 percentage points if he is covered.  If I remove 
state fixed effects, as also shown in Tables 3.9.1. and 3.9.2. the results suggest that his 
probability increases by 1.73 percentage points if his wife is covered, and decreases by 
1.03 percentage points if he is covered.  I believe that the model with state fixed effects 
better reflects the differences in laws and enforcement across states, but neither the 
results with or those without state fixed effects suggest the existence of 
complementarities in leisure. 
  
VII. Discussion 
In this paper I attempt to carefully investigate the channels through which joint 
labor supply decisions will operate among older couples.  For 1970 and 1980, I find 
consistent evidence that linkages in labor force participation exist beyond those due to 
unobserved heterogeneity in preferences and wages in the form of cross and interaction 
effects.  I find particularly strong evidence in 1980 that turning 62 has a strong effect on 
one’s spouse’s labor force participation.  In addition there is evidence that turning 65 has 
such effects.  
 These results suggest two conclusions.  First, liquidity constraints appear to play a 
role in labor force participation decisions among older couples, even after controlling for 
the marginal utility of wealth.  This finding confirms some research, e.g. Rust and Phelan 
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(1997).  Second, effects of relaxing liquidity constraints related to one spouse’s age are 
present for both spouses, suggesting some degree of intrahousehold budgeting. 
 Finally, I find evidence that own protection from age discrimination raises labor 
force participation for both men and women.  Despite the strength of this effect, there is 
no evidence that spousal coverage by age discrimination laws affects own labor force 
participation.  This finding suggests an absence of spousal leisure complementarities, 
contrary to what has often been suggested as a major reason for joint retirement.  A 
caveat, however, should be mentioned.  Because the data used are from the 1970 and 
1980 Censuses, this paper looks at an historical event.  Large changes in female labor 
supply and family structures, especially given the sample selection criteria, limit the 





 Whether Social Security affects labor supply has long been a topic of interest in 
economics.  The peak in retirement at age 62 has often been attributed to age 62 being the 
earliest age at which one can claim Social Security old-age benefits.  Furthermore, the 
peak at age 65 has long been attributed to the earliest age at which one is eligible for 
Medicare and pension benefits.  In this dissertation, I find evidence that supports the 
hypothesis that Social Security rules heavily influence the retirement decisions of older 
Americans.   
In chapter two, I examine the effect of the Repeal of the Retirement Earnings Test 
(RET) on the labor supply of older men.  After demonstrating that the RET acted 
effectively as a tax on earnings in old age for most men, I use a differences-in-differences 
model to estimate whether labor supply, as measured alternately by hours of work last 
week and employment last week, increased for the group directly affected by the repeal, 
65-to-69-year-olds.  I use 70+-year-olds as my comparison group and find that indeed 65-
to-69-year-olds increased labor supply in response to the repeal.  Additionally, the young 
cohort in my sample, 55-to-61-year-olds, decreased labor supply in anticipation of 
increased labor supply in old age. I find that continuing in employment increases 
dramatically among 65-year-olds suggesting that the long-term effect will be greater. 
Therefore, I would expect the effect of the repeal on the labor supply of older workers to 
increase over time as more workers opt to stay in the labor force until a later age than 
now as workers re-optimize their labor supply behavior over their lifetime. 
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When looking at simple means and correlations between labor supply and Social 
Security benefits receipt, I find that, after the repeal, more 65-to-69-year-olds receive 
benefits while working.  In addition, the negative correlation between Social Security 
income receipt and labor supply disappears.  This result suggests that the increase in 
labor supply was primarily driven by men who were going to claim benefits by the 
normal retirement age regardless of any changes to the law, and the result is not because 
men are working longer now because of the increase in the DRC. 
Furthermore, the share of 65-to-69-year-olds who are full-time workers, as 
defined by either 20+ hours worked last week or 30+ hours worked last week, increases 
dramatically for 65-to-69-year-olds after the repeal while it stays relatively constant for 
younger cohorts.  This result suggests that the RET was effectively reducing labor supply 
of the target group.  Previous studies have tried to examine the impact of a repeal of the 
Retirement Earnings Test on the labor supply of the elderly.  However, those models 
relied on both explicit functional forms and out-of-sample predictions to get their results 
in the absence of the repeal.  With data after the repeal now available, I find that, in fact, 
there are large labor supply effects. 
Drawbacks are that without a structural model, I cannot identify the channels 
through which the reduction in labor supply comes about.  Avenues for future research 
include examining the labor supply of non-whites and women as well.  Also, when more 
data become available, the results should become stronger than they are now, and this 
should be verifiable.  Additionally, one might consider incorporating the changing DRC 
and RET exempt amounts into the model, especially if a data set with more precise age 
measures becomes available.  Furthermore, when a suitable panel data set is released for 
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this time span, one might re-examine the issue of entry, exit, and continuation over a 
longer time frame.  Finally, it is worth investigating why the labor supply of the 70+-
year-olds also increased during this time period. 
In chapter three, I use a spouse’s turning 62 and 65 as instruments for the relaxing 
of liquidity constraints.  I find that, even after controlling for own age and various other 
covariates, there are discontinuities in labor supply when one turns 62 and 65.  This result 
is well-documented in the literature.  However, I also find that in both 1970 and 1980, the 
coefficient on the interaction term for wife’s and husband’s being at least age 62 is 
positive and significant in the wife’s labor supply equation.  This result suggests that 
there might be income pooling or complementarities in leisure.  Husband’s and wife’s 
being at least 62 means both are eligible for Social Security old-age and/or spouse’s 
benefits, relaxing the liquidity constraint the couple might have faced earlier.  In addition, 
even if only one spouse were driven to retire by his or her turning 62, the other might join 
him or her in retirement because they might enjoy spending time together.  In 1970, I also 
find a marginally significant coefficient for husband’s being at least 65 on wife’s labor 
force status, as she is more likely to be out of the labor force if her husband is at least 65.  
For the husband, I find that his wife’s being at least 65 increases his probability of being 
out of the labor force.  However, the interaction term for both being 65 or older is 
statistically significant and suggests that he works more when both are at least 65.  In 
1980, I find that the wife’s being at least 62 years old reduces the husband’s labor supply 
significantly.  For the wife’s labor supply, I find that the interaction terms for both 62 
years and over and 65 years and over are statistically significant. 
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To test whether there are complementarities in leisure, I introduce coverage by 
age discrimination laws as an instrument for wages.  I confirm Neumark and Stock’s 
(1999) results who find that coverage by age discrimination laws increases the probability 
of employment.  However, I find that spousal coverage by those laws has no effect on 
one’s labor supply.  This result suggests that complementarities in leisure are not 
important in the joint labor supply decision.  Previous studies have often cited 
complementarities in leisure as a possibly major component in the incidence of joint 
retirement of spouses.  However, for the sample I examined, complementarities do not 
seem to play a major role. 
This dissertation provides more evidence that Social Security rules affect the 
labor supply behavior of the elderly greatly.  While other studies had attempted to 
examine the effect of the retirement earnings test before, the data to make this analysis 
possible did not really exist.  Thus, previous studies had to rely on out-of-sample 
predictions and strict functional form assumptions to predict what the impact would be.  
My second chapter fills that void in the literature.  With three years of data after the 
repeal, I can look at the data itself to analyze the impact of the repeal on labor supply of 
the elderly.   
The third chapter examines the issue of joint retirement in an historical context.  I 
find that indeed, husbands and wives do seem to make joint labor supply decisions even 
accounting for unobservable characteristics and preferences.  In addition, I find that 
complementarities in leisure seem to be less of a factor in driving this decision.  Rather, 
income pooling seems a more plausible explanation. Identification strategies of previous 
studies examining joint retirement did not allow the authors to separate income pooling 
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from complementarities in leisure.  Using age discrimination laws as instruments allows 
me to distinguish between complementarities in leisure and income pooling. 
I find that Social Security rules affect the labor supply of the elderly.  Major 
changes such as the repeal of the Retirement Earnings Test have great implications not 
only for beneficiaries but also for those near retirement age.  In addition, the issue of joint 
retirement should be taken into account when proposing Social Security rules changes, 
possibly due to income pooling within the family, less so because of complementarities in 
leisure.  As Social Security will be reformed in the coming years, policymakers should be 
mindful of the dynamic nature of changing the rules to avoid unintended negative 






Social Security Benefits Conditional on Age at Which They Were First Claimed 
 
 Claim At Age 62 65 70 
Die At Age DRC    
80 3% 1,440 1,500 1,150 
85 3% 1,840 2,000 1,725 
90 3% 2,240 2,500 2,300 
80 5% 1,440 1,500 1,250 
85 5% 1,840 2,000 1,875 
90 5% 2,240 2,500 2,500 
80 6.5% 1,440 1,500 1,325 
85 6.5% 1,840 2,000 1,987.5 






Expected Value of the Stream of Social Security Benefits for White Males, 
 





Index of Value of 












                                                          
17The life tables from the National Vital Statistics Report, Vol. 50, No. 6, Mar 21, 
2002 were used to compute the expected value of the stream of SS benefits.  The DRC is 
assumed to be five percent per year.  The amounts above are relative to the annual 
Primary Insurance Amount (PIA), the benefit amount a worker receives annually if he 
starts claiming at the NRA, which was 65 at the time.  A value of 100 corresponds to the 
annual PIA.  In other words, a white male claiming at age 62 can expect to receive 14.218 
times the amount of his annual PIA over his lifetime.  I implicitly assume that one can 
either receive the full amount of benefits or none each year, but not partial benefits that 
would be received if one had some of the benefits taxed away.  Also, full annual benefits 
are claimed at the end of the year (for simplicity), and benefits can only be claimed at 











Effect Overall Effect 
55-61 Negative Negative Negative 
62-6419 Negative Ambiguous Ambiguous 
65-69 Negative Positive Positive 
70+ None None None 
 
 
                                                          
18 Note that the income effect comes into play only if the worker was already 
earning more than the exempt amount.  It will only reduce hours of workers already 
working a lot of hours, not push part-time workers out of the labor force or reduce hours 
of workers who were below the exempt amount anyway. 
 
19 The effect for 62-to-64 is unclear because some of the workers in this group 
also experience a reduction in the marginal tax rate on excess income from 50 percent to 




Variables Used in Regressions 
 
Variable Definition 
Hours Hours worked last week at all jobs 
Work Respondent at work or not 
Education Dummy variables for each level of education attainment in the CPS 
Year Year of survey 
Month Month of survey 
Age Dummy variables for each age 
Target Group Dummy variable for treatment group:  age>=65 and age<=69 and year>=2000 
Young Group Dummy variable for treatment group:  age<=61 and year>=2000 




Values for Education Variable 
 
Value Educational Attainment 
31 Less Than 1st Grade 
32 1st, 2nd, 3rd, or 4th Grade 
33 5th or 6th Grade 
34 7th or 8th Grade 
35 9th Grade 
36 10th Grade 
37 11th Grade 
38 12th Grade, No Diploma 
39 High School Grad-Diploma or Equiv. (GED) 
40 Some College But No Degree 
41 Associate Degree-Occupational/Vocational 
42 Associate Deg.-Academic Program 
43 Bachelor's Degree(ex.: BA, AB, BS) 
44 Master's Degree(ex.: MA, MS, MEng, MEd, MSW) 
45 Professional School Deg(ex.: MD, DDS, DVM) 




Means for Work and Hours Variables in ORG 1, January 1997-December 2002 
 































































Means for Work and Hours Variables in ORG 1,  
 
Pre-Repeal and Post-Repeal Observations 
 






































































































Means of ORG 1 Variables of Individuals who Leave the Sample Before 
 



























































































































Testing the Differences in the Means for the four Age Groups,  
 
before the Repeal and after the Repeal 
 
Sample Dependent Variable Obs. Difference in Means P-Value 
Young 
(55-61) 
Employment 28,747 -0.0032 0.512 
Intermediate 
(62-64) 
Employment 9,885 0.0234 0.020 
Target 
(65-69) 
Employment 15,864 0.0339 0.000 
Old 
(70-75) 
Employment 16,815 0.0103 0.076 
Young 
(55-61) 
Hours 28,747 -0.4834 0.061 
Intermediate 
(62-64) 
Hours 9,885 0.8691 0.057 
Target 
(65-69) 
Hours 15,864 1.5612 0.000 
Old 
(70-75) 




Probit Estimates of Work Equation, Sample 1B, ORG 1,  
 
January 1997-December 2002, Age Covariates 
 
 Education Group All HS & Less BA & More 



















































































































(Standard Error) on 
Dummy Variable 






N  71,311 36,352 20,125 
 




Probit Estimates of Work Equation, Sample 1B, ORG 1,  
 
January 1997-December 2002, Education Covariates 
 




































































N  71,311 36,352 20,125 
 





Probit Estimates of Work Equation,Sample 1B, ORG 1,  
 
January 1997-December 2002, Month and Year Covariates 
 
 Education Group All HS & Less BA & More 


























































































































N  71,311 36,352 20,125 
 




Probit Estimates of Work Equation, Sample 1B, ORG 1,  
 
January 1997-December 2002, Repeal Covariates 
 
 Education Group All HS & Less BA & More 














on Repeal of 
RET Variable 






N  71,311 36,352 20,125 
 




Probit Estimates of Work Equation, Sample 1B, ORG 1, January 1997-December 2002,  
 
Repeal Covariates, With Age Group 65-69 Broken Up Into Individual Age Groups 
 
 Education Group All HS & Less BA & More 
















































N  71,311 36,352 20,125 
 




Linear Probability Estimates of Work Equation, Sample 1B, ORG 1,  
 
January 1997-December 2002, Age Covariates 
 
 Education Group All HS & Less BA & More 



















































































































(Standard Error) on 
Dummy Variable 






N  71,311 36,352 20,125 
 
Robust standard errors used. 
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 Table 2.9.2. 
 
Linear Probability Estimates of Work Equation, Sample 1B, ORG 1,  
 
January 1997-December 2002, Education Covariates 
 




































































N  71,311 36,352 20,125 
 




Linear Probability Estimates of Work Equation, Sample 1B, ORG 1,  
 
January 1997-December 2002, Month and Year Covariates 
 
 Education Group All HS & Less BA & More 


























































































































N  71,311 36,352 20,125 
 




Linear Probability Estimates of Work Equation, Sample 1B, ORG 1,  
 
January 1997-December 2002, Repeal Covariates 
 
 Education Group All HS & Less BA & More 














on Repeal of 
RET Variable 



















Linear Probability Estimates of Work Equation, Sample 1B, ORG 1, January 1997- 
 
December 2002, Repeal Covariates, With Age Group 65-69 Broken Up  
 
Into Individual Age Groups 
 
 Education Group All HS & Less BA & More 






































on Repeal of RET 
Variable 















Robust standard errors used. 
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 Table 2.10.1. 
 
Linear Estimates of Hours Equation, Sample 1B, ORG 1,  
 
January 1997-December 2002, Age Covariates 
 
 Education Group All HS & Less BA & More 



















































































































(Standard Error) on 
Dummy Variable 






N  71,311 36,352 20,125 
 




Linear Estimates of Hours Equation, Sample 1B, ORG 1,  
 
January 1997-December 2002, Education Covariates 
 




































































N  71,311 36,352 20,125 
 




Linear Estimates of Hours Equation, Sample 1B, ORG 1,  
 
January 1997-December 2002, Month and Year Covariates 
 
 Education Group All HS & Less BA & More 


























































































































N  71,311 36,352 20,125 
 




Linear Estimates of Hours Equation, Sample 1B, ORG 1,  
 
January 1997-December 2002, Repeal Covariates 
 
 Education Group All HS & Less BA & More 














on Repeal of RET 
Variable 



















Linear Estimates of Hours Equation, 
 
Sample 1B, ORG 1, January 1997-December 2002, Repeal Covariates 
 
With Age Group 65-69 Broken Up Into Individual Age Groups 
 
 Education Group All HS & Less BA & More 






































on Repeal of RET 
Variable 



















Probit Estimates of Work and Labor Force Transition Equations, 
 

















































































































































































































N  59,127 59,127 59,127 59,127 
 




Probit Estimates of Work and Labor Force Transition Equations, 
 



































































































































N  59,127 59,127 59,127 59,127 
 




Probit Estimates of Work and Labor Force Transition Equations, 
 




Employment Entry Exit Continuation 
Year=1996 
 





























































































































































N  59,127 59,127 59,127 59,127 
 




Probit Estimates of Work and Labor Force Transition Equations, 
 







































N  59,127 59,127 59,127 59,127 
 




Probit Estimates of Work and Labor Force Transition Equations, 
 
Sample 2, ORG 2, January 1997-December 2002, Repeal Covariates,  
 




Work Entry Exit Continuation 
































































N  59,127 59,127 59,127 59,127 
 






Linear Probability Estimates of Work and Labor Force Transition Equations, 
 

















































































































































































































N  59,127 59,127 59,127 59,127 
 




Linear Probability Estimates of Work and Labor Force Transition Equations, 
 


































































































































N  59,127 59,127 59,127 59,127 
 
Robust standard errors used. 
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 Table 2.12.3. 
 
Linear Probability Estimates of Work and Labor Force Transition Equations, 
 


































































































































































N  59,127 59,127 59,127 59,127 
 




Linear Probability Estimates of Work and Labor Force Transition Equations,  
 
Sample 2, ORG 2, January 1997-December 2002, Repeal Covariates 
 
  Dependent 
Variable 


















































Linear Probability Estimates of Work and Labor Force Transition Equations, 
 
Sample 2, ORG 2, January 1997-December 2002, Repeal Covariates,  
 




Work Entry Exit Continuation 















































































Test whether Certain Coefficients are Different for the High-Educated from the Low- 
 







Employment All Except 
Education 
0.000 Probit 
Employment All Treatment 
Groups 
0.168 Probit 
Employment Target Group 0.081 Probit 
Employment All Except 
Education 
0.000 Linear 
Employment All Treatment 
Groups 
0.195 Linear 
Employment Target Group 0.085 Linear 
Hours All Except 
Education 
0.000 Linear 
Hours All Treatment 
Groups 
0.350 Linear 






Probit Estimates of Work Equation, Sample 1B, ORG 1, January 1997-December 2002,  
 
Repeal Covariates, Treatment Date is April 2000 
 
 Education Group All HS & Less BA & More 














on Repeal of 
RET Variable 






N  71,311 36,352 20,125 
 
Unreported covariates include dummy variables for age, educational attainment, month  
 




Probit Estimates of Work Equation, Sample 1B, ORG 1, January 1997-December 2002,  
 
Repeal Covariates, With Age Group 65-69 Broken Up Into Individual Age Groups,  
 
Treatment Date is April 2000 
 
 Education Group All HS & Less BA & More 






































on Repeal of RET 
Variable 






N  71,311 36,352 20,125 
 
Unreported covariates include dummy variables for age, educational attainment, month  
 




Linear Probability Estimates of Work Equation, Sample 1B, ORG 1,  
 
January 1997-December 2002, Repeal Covariates, Treatment Date is April 2000 
 
 Education Group All HS & Less BA & More 














on Repeal of 
RET Variable 















Unreported covariates include dummy variables for age, educational attainment, month  
 




Linear Probability Estimates of Work Equation, Sample 1B, ORG 1, January 1997- 
 
December 2002, Repeal Covariates, With Age Group 65-69 Broken Up Into Individual  
 
Age Groups, Treatment Date is April 2000 
 
 Education Group All HS & Less BA & More 






































on Repeal of RET 
Variable 















Unreported covariates include dummy variables for age, educational attainment, month  
 




Linear Estimates of Hours Equation, Sample 1B, ORG 1,  
 
January 1997-December 2002, Repeal Covariates, Treatment Date is April 2000 
 
 Education Group All HS & Less BA & More 














on Repeal of RET 
Variable 















Unreported covariates include dummy variables for age, educational attainment, month  
 




Linear Estimates of Hours Equation, Sample 1B, ORG 1,  
 
January 1997-December 2002, Repeal Covariates, With Age Group 65-69 Broken  
 
Up Into Individual Age Groups, Treatment Date is April 2000 
 
 Education Group All HS & Less BA & More 






































on Repeal of RET 
Variable 















Unreported covariates include dummy variables for age, educational attainment, month  
 




Probit Estimates of Work and Labor Force Transition Equations, Sample 2, ORG 2,  
 







































N  59,127 59,127 59,127 59,127 
 
Unreported covariates include dummy variables for age, educational attainment, month  
 




Probit Estimates of Work and Labor Force Transition Equations, Sample 2, ORG 2,  
 
January 1997-December 2002, Repeal Covariates, With Age Group 65-69 Broken Up  
 






Work Entry Exit Continuation 
































































N  59,127 59,127 59,127 59,127 
 
Unreported covariates include dummy variables for age, educational attainment, month  
 




Linear Probability Estimates of Work and Labor Force Transition Equations,  
 
Sample 2, ORG 2, January 1997-December 2002, Repeal Covariates,  
 


















































Unreported covariates include dummy variables for age, educational attainment, month  
 





Linear Probability Estimates of Work and Labor Force Transition Equations, 
 
Sample 2, ORG 2, January 1997-December 2002, Repeal Covariates, With Age Group  
 




Work Entry Exit Continuation 











































































Unreported covariates include dummy variables for age, educational attainment, month  
 




Probit Estimates of Work Equation, Sample 1B, ORG 1,  
 
January 1997-December 2002, Repeal Covariates, Includes Disabled Persons 
 
 Education Group All HS & Less BA & More 














on Repeal of 
RET Variable 






N  76,864 40,612 20,568 
 
Unreported covariates include dummy variables for age, educational attainment, month  
 




Probit Estimates of Work Equation, Sample 1B, ORG 1, January 1997-December 2002,  
 
Repeal Covariates, With Age Group 65-69 Broken Up Into Individual Age Groups,  
 
Includes Disabled Persons 
 
 Education Group All HS & Less BA & More 






































on Repeal of RET 
Variable 






N  76,864 40,612 20,568 
 
Unreported covariates include dummy variables for age, educational attainment, month  
 




Linear Probability Estimates of Work Equation, Sample 1B, ORG 1,  
 
January 1997-December 2002, Repeal Covariates, Includes Disabled Persons 
 
 Education Group All HS & Less BA & More 














on Repeal of 
RET Variable 















Unreported covariates include dummy variables for age, educational attainment, month  
 




Linear Probability Estimates of Work Equation, Sample 1B, ORG 1, January 1997- 
 
December 2002, Repeal Covariates, With Age Group 65-69 Broken Up Into Individual  
 
Age Groups, Includes Disabled Persons 
 
 Education Group All HS & Less BA & More 






































on Repeal of RET 
Variable 















Unreported covariates include dummy variables for age, educational attainment, month  
 




Linear Estimates of Hours Equation, Sample 1B, ORG 1,  
 
January 1997-December 2002, Repeal Covariates, Includes Disabled Persons 
 
 Education Group All HS & Less BA & More 














on Repeal of RET 
Variable 















Unreported covariates include dummy variables for age, educational attainment, month  
 




Linear Estimates of Hours Equation, Sample 1B, ORG 1,  
 
January 1997-December 2002, Repeal Covariates, With Age Group 65-69  
 
Broken Up Into Individual Age Groups, Includes Disabled Persons 
 
 Education Group All HS & Less BA & More 






































on Repeal of RET 
Variable 















Unreported covariates include dummy variables for age, educational attainment, month  
 





Probit Estimates of Work and Labor Force Transition Equations, Sample 2, ORG 2,  
 







































N  63,786 63,786 63,786 63,786 
 
Unreported covariates include dummy variables for age, educational attainment, month  
 




Probit Estimates of Work and Labor Force Transition Equations, Sample 2, ORG 2,  
 
January 1997-December 2002, Repeal Covariates, With Age Group 65-69 Broken Up  
 




Work Entry Exit Continuation 
































































N  63,786 63,786 63,786 63,786 
 
Unreported covariates include dummy variables for age, educational attainment, month  
 




Linear Probability Estimates of Work and Labor Force Transition Equations, 
 
Sample 2, ORG 2, January 1997-December 2002, Repeal Covariates,  
 


















































Unreported covariates include dummy variables for age, educational attainment, month  
 





Linear Probability Estimates of Work and Labor Force Transition Equations, 
 
Sample 2, ORG 2, January 1997-December 2002, Repeal Covariates, With Age Group  
 




Work Entry Exit Continuation 











































































Unreported covariates include dummy variables for age, educational attainment, month  
 




Descriptive Statistics, Census Data, 1970 and 1980 
 
 1970 1980 
 Husband Wife Husband Wife 
























































































































N 123,581 132,310 
 
Standard deviations in parentheses. 
                                                          





Own Labor Supply Conditional on Spouse’s Labor Supply, Census Data, 1970 
 
1970 Wife in Labor Force Husband in Labor Force 
Spouse in Labor Force 0.702 0.850 
Spouse out of Labor Force 0.447 0.662 
Difference 0.255 0.188 




Own Labor Supply Conditional on Spouse’s Labor Supply, Census Data, 1980 
 
1980 Wife in Labor Force Husband in Labor Force 
Spouse in Labor Force 0.697 0.845 
Spouse out of Labor Force 0.439 0.649 
Difference 0.233 0.196 




Values for Education Variable 
 
Values Educational Attainment 
1 Less than High School 
2 High School Graduate or Equivalent 
3 Some College 
4 College Graduate 




Bivariate Probit, no Age Discrimination Laws, Census Data 1970, other Covariates 
 
1970 No State Fixed Effects With State Fixed Effects 
 Wife Husband Wife Husband 




























































































































Demeaned Husband’s Age  





































Demeaned Wife’s Age  

















N 123,581 123,581 
 
Bivariate probit marginal effects reported (standard error in parentheses).  Dependent  
 





Bivariate Probit, no Age Discrimination Laws, Census Data 1970, Covariates of Interest 
 
1970 No State Fixed Effects With State Fixed Effects 
 Wife Husband Wife Husband 


























































Bivariate probit marginal effects reported (standard error in parentheses).  Dependent  
 





Univariate Probit, no Age Discrimination Laws, Census Data 1970, other Covariates 
 
1970 No State Fixed Effects With State Fixed Effects 
 Wife Husband Wife Husband 




























































































































Demeaned Husband’s Age  





































Demeaned Wife’s Age 

















N 123,581 123,581 
 
Univariate probit marginal effects reported (standard error in parentheses).  Dependent  
 





Univariate Probit, no Age Discrimination Laws, Census Data 1970, Covariates of Interest 
 
1970 No State Fixed Effects With State Fixed Effects 
 Wife Husband Wife Husband 
















































N 123,581 123,581 
 
Univariate probit marginal effects reported (standard error in parentheses).  Dependent  
 
variable is a dummy variable that equals 1 if person is out of labor force, 0 otherwise. 
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 Table 3.6.1. 
 
Bivariate Probit, no Age Discrimination Laws, Census Data 1980, other Covariates 
 
1980 No State Fixed Effects With State Fixed Effects 
 Wife Husband Wife Husband 




























































































































Demeaned Husband’s Age 





































Demeaned Wife’s Age  









N 132,310 132,310 
 
Bivariate probit marginal effects reported (standard error in parentheses).  Dependent  
 




Bivariate Probit, no Age Discrimination Laws, Census Data 1980, Covariates of Interest 
 
1980 No State Fixed Effects With State Fixed Effects 
 Wife Husband Wife Husband 


























































Bivariate probit marginal effects reported (standard error in parentheses).  Dependent  
 





Univariate Probit, no Age Discrimination Laws, Census Data 1980, other Covariates 
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Univariate probit marginal effects reported (standard error in parentheses).  Dependent  
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N 132,310 132,310 
 
Univariate probit marginal effects reported (standard error in parentheses).  Dependent  
 




















Bivariate Probit, with Age Discrimination Laws, Census Data 1970, other Covariates 
 
1970 No State Fixed Effects With State Fixed Effects 
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Bivariate probit marginal effects reported (standard error in parentheses).  Dependent  
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Bivariate probit marginal effects reported (standard error in parentheses).  Dependent  
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Bivariate probit marginal effects reported (standard error in parentheses).  Dependent  
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Bivariate probit marginal effects reported (standard error in parentheses).  Dependent  
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